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Summary
Distributed system often gives rise to complex concurrent and interacting activities.
The distributed systems with high reliability requirements make the development
of such systems more complicated. This thesis demonstrates a series of modeling,
customization and verification of generic fault tolerant software architecture for
guiding the development of distributed systems with high reliability requirements.
In this thesis, we first propose a novel heterogeneous software architecture, namely
Generic Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA), which incorporates fault
tolerant techniques in the early system design phase. The proposed GFTSA com-
bines several widely used basic software architecture styles to guide the develop-
ment of distributed systems involving the cooperative & competitive concurrency.
The fault tolerant techniques incorporated in GFTSA can deal with not only the
exception the influence of which is limited within a single component, but also the
exception which can affect the control flows of more than one component within a
system.
Second, we formally model the GFTSA by using the Object-Z language, and for-
mally reason about the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA. The formalisms of
a software architecture can provide precise, explicit, common idioms & pattern s
to the system designers. The formal language Object-Z based on set theory and
predicate logic can capture the static and dynamic system properties in a highly
structured way. Based on the reasoning rules of Object-Z, we can derive the fault
tolerant properties from the GFTSA model to verify that GFTSA can preserve the
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fault tolerant properties.
Third, we build a template based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA by using the
XML-based Variant Configuration Language (XVCL) technique. This template can
be reused in the development of distributed systems with high reliability require-
ments. By customizing this template, we can auto-generate the Object-Z models
for the developed systems. A case study of Sales Control System (SCS), a specific
mission critical distributed system, is presented to demonstrate the customization
process. Following the reasoning rules of Object-Z, we can formally reason about
the fault tolerant properties of SCS based on the generated Object-Z model from
the template.
Fourth, we embed the formal GFTSA model in the Prototype Verification System
(PVS) environment to achieve mechanical verification support for reasoning about
the fault tolerant properties. In addition, we build a template based on the PVS
model of GFTSA by using the XVCL technique. By customizing this template,
we can auto-generate the PVS models for the developed safety critical distributed
systems guided by GFTSA. Based on the generated PVS models, we can mechan-
ically verify the fault tolerant properties of the developed systems by using the
theorem prover of PVS. A case study of Line Direction Agreement System (LDAS)
is presented to illustrate the customization process and mechanical verification.
Finally, we propose a template approach for the auto-generation of specifications
and proof obligations at the customized system level from the GFTSA. By cus-
tomizing this template, we can generate not only the formal models of safety critical
CONTENTS ix
distributed systems, but also the proof scripts for the fault tolerant properties of
such systems. Based on the generated formal models and proof scripts, we are able
to mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties in batch mode of PVS by using
ProofLite technique. A case study of Electronic Power System (EPS) is presented
to demonstrate the customization process and mechanical verification.
Part of the work in this thesis has been published in the journal IEEE Transactions
on Reliability [88], and international conference APSEC’06 [87].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Goals
A distributed system can be viewed as a system composed of a set of concurrently
interacting activities at different locations that cooperate with each other to per-
form a joint task [13]. Distributed systems are becoming increasingly widespread in
business and scientific computing environments, which often give rise to complex
concurrent and interacting activities. In practice, different kinds of concurrency
might co-exists in a distributed system, which thus make the task of developing
distributed systems complicated. Due to no small measure to their complexity, dis-
tributed systems are prone to faults and errors. For the distributed systems with
high requirements for reliability [38], fault tolerant techniques are necessary, which
can provide a practical way to improve the dependability of such systems [40, 83].
The concern of the fault tolerance makes the development of distributed systems
1
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more complicated [15]. Software architecture is identified as a critical design
methodology which can ease the complexity of the development of distributed
systems, as software architecture can provide a generic framework to guide the
development of distributed systems[23, 70, 10]. How to incorporate fault tolerant
techniques with functional aspects in the software architecture level is a new re-
search area that has recently gained considerable attention. Existing work in this
area mostly emphasizes the creation of fault tolerance mechanisms[60, 63]; descrip-
tions of software architectures with respect to their reliability properties[33, 52];
and the evolution of component-based software architectures by adding or chang-
ing components to guarantee reliability properties[18, 26, 27]. In this thesis, we
propose a novel heterogenous software architecture, namely Generic Fault Toler-
ant Software Architecture (GFTSA), which incorporates fault tolerant techniques
in the early system design phase. GFTSA can provide a generic framework to
guide the development of distributed systems involving not only different kinds of
concurrency, but also high reliability requirements.
Good understanding and precise representation of software architecture can lead to
reliable system implementations based on this architecture[9, 34]. The well-defined
semantics & syntax make formal modeling techniques suitable for precisely speci-
fying, and formally verifying architecture designs[45, 47, 69, 43, 44, 19, 42]. The
formal language Z[76, 77] has been used to formalize several software architecture
styles[1, 70]. Z is a formal specification language based on set theory and predicate
logic, which can capture the static and dynamic properties of software architec-
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ture. Object-Z[21, 20, 74] is an extension of the Z formal specification language to
accommodate object orientation. Compared to formal language Z, Object-Z can
improve the clarity of large specifications through enhanced structuring, and help
the system designers to reuse the GFTSA model via inheritance & instantiation
mechanisms. In order to provide common idioms & patterns of GFTSA to the
system designers, we investigate to formally model GFTSA by using the Object-Z
language. Based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we propose to formally rea-
son about the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA following the reasoning rules of
Object-Z[72].
GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of distributed system with high
reliability requirements. How the GFTSA model can be reused in the development
of specific distributed systems is the next issue we need to tackle. The GFTSA
model can be customized into the formal models of specific systems by using the
inheritance & instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z. In this thesis, we propose
to make such customization process more efficient and systematic. The XML-
based Variant Configuration Language (XVCL) [36, 75, 35] is a meta-programming
technique developed to facilitate building flexible, adaptable, and reusable software
artifacts. Following the mechanisms of XVCL, we propose to build a template for
the customization of GFTSA as generic, adaptable fragments based on the Object-Z
model of GFTSA. By customizing this built template, we can generate the Object-Z
models of specific systems automatically. Based on the reasoning rules of Object-Z,
we also can formally reason about the fault tolerant properties of such systems.
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Object-Z, a highly expressive formal language, can capture the properties of mod-
els in an explicit and compact way. Even though Object-Z is a good modeling
techniques that can provide precise analysis and documentation, Object-Z lacks of
tool support for mechanical verification, therefore, the formal reasoning about the
GFTSA model and specific system models customized from GFTSA are all manual-
based, which are laborious and error-prone. In this thesis, we investigate to embed
the GFTSA model in Prototype Verification System (PVS)[56, 55] to make the ver-
ification more systematic, since the theorem prover of PVS can provide mechanical
proof support for the verification. The Prototype Verification System (PVS) is a
proof system developed at SRI. PVS has a powerful interactive theorem prover
and its automation suffices to prove many results automatically, which has been
applied successfully to large and difficult application in both academic and indus-
trial settings[31, 64]. We also propose to build a template based on the PVS model
of GFTSA by using XVCL technique. When developing distributed systems with
high reliability requirements guided by GFTSA, we can mechanically verify the
fault tolerant properties of developed systems based on the generated PVS models
from this built template.
The theorem prover of PVS can help us mechanically verify the properties of mod-
els, which offers a collection of powerful primitive proof commands that are applied
interactively under user guidance. The primitive proof commands input by user to
verify one specific property can constitute the proof script for this property. In the
batch mode of PVS, we can apply the proof script directly to the theorem prover of
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PVS to verify one specific property, which does not require inputting each primi-
tive proof command interactively. By customizing the generic proof scripts, we can
get the proof scripts for the developed distributed systems, and apply them to the
theorem prover of PVS to verify the fault tolerant properties of developed systems
in batch mode. Since ProofLite [53] technique can provide user-friendly interface
of batch mode execution and interactive proof scripting notation to the system
designers, we investigate to use it in our template approach. As the proof scripting
notation supported by ProofLite enables a semi-literate proving style where speci-
fication and proof scripts reside in the same context, we investigate to extend the
built template based on the PVS model of GFTSA to involve not only generic PVS
specification, but also generic proof scripts for the generic fault tolerant properties
by using the XVCL and ProofLite techniques. By customizing this template, we
can generate both PVS models, and proof scripts for the developed systems. Based
on the generated PVS specification and proof scripts, we can mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of developed systems in batch mode of PVS supported
by ProofLite technique.
1.2 Thesis Outline and Overview
The thesis is structured into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 is devoted to an overview of
the formal language Object-Z, the XVCL technique for customization process, the
PVS and ProofLite techniques for mechanical verification.
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In chapter 3, we propose a novel heterogeneous software architecture, namely
Generic Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA). We describe the software
architecture style and fault tolerant techniques involved in GFTSA.
In chapter 4, we formally model GFTSA by using the Object-Z language. Based
on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we formally reason about the fault tolerant
properties of GFTSA, following the reasoning rules of Object-Z.
In chapter 5, we build a template based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA by
using the XVCL technique. This template can be reused in the high level model
design of distributed systems with high reliability requirements via customization
process. A case study of Sales Control System (SCS) is presented to illustrate the
customization process.
In chapter 6, we embed the formal GFTSA model in the PVS environment to
achieve mechanical verification support for reasoning about the fault tolerant prop-
erties. Several significant fault tolerant properties of GFTSA are mechanically ver-
ified by using the theorem prover of PVS. In addition, we build a template based
on the PVS model of GFTSA by using the XVCL technique. This template can be
reused in generating the PVS models of developed distributed systems guided by
GFTSA. The fault tolerant properties of developed systems can be mechanically
verified based on the generated PVS models.
In chapter 7, we present two case studies to illustrate the mechanical verification
of safety critical distributed systems. A case study of Line Direction Agreement
System (LDAS) is presented to demonstrate that we can generate the PVS model
of LDAS from the template based on the PVS model of GFTSA. Based on this
generated model, we can mechanical verify the fault tolerant properties of LDAS
by using the theorem prover of PVS. By summarizing the proof scripts for the fault
tolerant properties of safety critical distributed systems, we extend the template
based on the PVS model of GFTSA to involve the generic proof scripts. By cus-
tomizing this template, we can generate not only PVS specification, but also proof
scripts for the fault tolerant properties of developed systems guided by GFTSA.
Based on the generated PVS models and proof scripts, we can mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of developed systems in batch mode of PVS. Another
case study of Electronic Power System (EPS) is presented to demonstrate the cus-
tomization process and mechanical verification in batch mode of PVS.
Chapter 8 gives the conclusion of the thesis and future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter sets the context for the later chapters, giving notations and brief




Z[76, 77, 29] is a formal specification language based on set theory and predicate
logic. Object-Z[20, 74] is an extension of the Z formal specification language to
accommodate object orientation. The main reason for this extension is to improve
the clarity of large specifications through enhanced structuring. The essential ex-
tension to Z given by Object-Z is the class construct which groups the definition
of a state schema and the definitions of its associated operations. A class is a tem-
plate for objects of that class: for each such object, its states are instances of the
state schema of the class and its individual state transitions conform to individual
operations of the class. An object is said to be an instance of a class and to evolve
according to the definitions of its class. Syntactically, a class definition is a named
box. In this box, the constituents of the class are defined and related. The main
constituents are: a visible list, a state schema, an initial state schema and opera-
tion schemas. We consider a simple example queue to illustrate the basic features
of Object-Z. The essential behavior of this system is to receive a new message or
send a message, which needs to preserve the FIFO property.
Queue[Item]
¹(Init, Join,Leave) [visibility list]
items : seq Item [state schema]
Init
items = 〈 〉 [initial state]









items 6= 〈 〉
items = 〈item!〉aitems ′
The Queue[Item] class schema is generic with the parameter Item representing the
type of items in the queue. The visible list specifies the interface between objects
of class schema, and their environment. The state variable items is declared in
the state schema, which would be changed by the operations of class. The Init
schema defines the initial state of the state variable. The Join, and Leave operation
schemas specify that one item? joins the queue, and one item! leaves the queue,
besides the state transformations of variable items.
2.2 XML-based Variant Configuration Language
(XVCL)
XVCL[36, 35, 75, 89] is a meta programming technique developed to facilitate
building flexible, adaptable, and reusable software artifacts. When developing an
XVCL solution, we partition a problem description(e.g. a software specification,
or a software program) into generic, adaptable meta-components called x-frames.
Each x-frame contains a fragment of problem description, called Textual Content.
The Textual Content is written in a base language, which can be any language,
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such as Z specification language, or Java programming language.
XVCL can be seen as a meta-language whose commands direct adaption of x-
frames. Textual Content in x-frames is instrumented with XVCL commands for
change. The XVCL commands mark the anticipated variation points in x-frames,
injecting flexibility into their Textual Contents. The x-frame adaption process
includes x-frame composition and customization. The 〈 value-of expr=“?@var?”/〉
command marks the variant point as expression var , which can be customized by
a 〈set〉 command in the ancestor x-frame. The XVCL command 〈break〉 command
marks a place in the x-frame at which the x-frame can be customized by an 〈insert〉
command declared in the ancestor x-frames.
X-frames related by 〈adapt〉 commands form an x-framework. The specification
x-frame, SPC for short, specifies what variant requirements you need in a specific
system. The SPC specifies how to adapt the x-framework in order to accom-
modate required variants. The SPC becomes a root of an x-framework. Dur-
ing x-framework processing, the XVCL processor interprets the XVCL commands
contained in the SPC, traverses an x-framework, performs adaption by executing
XVCL commands embedded in x-frames, and emits code components for a specific
system.
XVCL is an adaption domain-independent language, method and tool. XVCL per-
forms best in immature, poorly understood and evolving domains and in domains
where frequent changes occur in both large and small granularity levels.
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2.3 Prototype Verification System (PVS)
PVS[57, 59, 68, 58] is an integrated environment for formal specification and for-
mal verification. It has been developed at SRI International Computer Science
Laboratory for more than 25 years and used intensively for many practical com-
plex systems. The distinguishing feature of PVS is its integration of an expressive
specification language and powerful theorem-proving capabilities. The specification
language of PVS augments higher-order logic with a sophisticated type system con-
taining predicate subtypes and dependent types. In order to support modularity
and reuse, the specifications are logically organized into parameterized theories.
The theories are linked by import and export lists.
A theory consists of a sequence of declarations, which provide names for types, con-
stants, variables, and formulas. Type declarations are used to introduce new type
names to the context by using one of the keywords TYPE, and TYPE+. Variable
declarations introduce new variables and associate a type with them. Constant dec-
larations introduce new constants, specify their type and optionally provide values.
Since the specification language of PVS is higher order logic based, the constant
can refer to functions and relations, as well as the usual (0-ary) constants. Formula
declaration introduces axioms, assumptions, lemmas, and obligations. The expres-
sion that makes up the body of the formula is a boolean expression. The identifier
associated with the declaration may be referred during proofs. The specification
language offers the usual set of expression constructs, including logical and arith-
metic operators, quantifiers, lambda abstractions, function application, tuples, and
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a polymorphic IF-THEN-ELSE. Expressions may appear in the body of a formula
or constant declarations, or as an actual parameter of a theory instance. The type-
checker tool of PVS can check the syntactic consistency of the specification, such
as undeclared names and ambiguous types.
The theorem prover of PVS maintains a proof tree. Each node of the proof tree can
be considered as a proof goal. Each proof goal is a sequent consisting of a sequence
of formulas called antecedents and a sequence of formulas called consequents. The
intuitive interpretation of a sequent is that the conjunction of the antecedents
implies the disjunction of the consequents. The proof tree starts off with a root node
of the form ` A, where A is the theorem to be proved. PVS proof steps build a proof
tree by adding subtrees to leaf nodes as directed by the proof commands, which are
prompted by the users. Once a sequent is recognized as true, that branch of the
proof tree is terminated. All the branches of the proof tree have been terminated
means that the theorem is proved successfully. A PVS proof command provides
the means to construct proof trees when applied to a sequent. The execution of
PVS proof commands can either generate further branches, or complete a branch
and move the control over to the next branch in the proof tree. These commands
can be used to introduce lemmas, expand definitions, apply decision procedures,
eliminate quantifiers, and so on. For example, the primitive proof command flatten
can deal with propositional by simplifying disjunctive in a formula, and the assert
command can carry out quantifier rules, induction, simplification by using decision
procedures for equality and linear arithmetic.
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2.4 ProofLite Technique
ProofLite1, a PVS tool, extends the theorem prover interface with a batch proving
utility and a proof scripting notation. ProofLite enables a semi-literate proving
style where specification and proof scripts reside in the same file. ProofLite can
provide a user-friendly interface to a PVS batch execution by including the com-
mand line utility proveit that executes the theorem prover in batch mode on a .pvs
file and rerun all its proofs. The proof scripting notation provided by ProofLite is
written in specially formatted comments that resides in regular .pvs files. Below




a, b: VAR real
th1: LEMMA a*a >=0
%|- th1: PROOF (grind) QED




%|- (spread (case " a >= 0")
1The ProofLite is electronically available from http://research.nianet.org/~munoz/
ProofLite.





In this thms theory, th1 and th2 are two LEMMAS which need to be proved.
Following each LEMMA, there is a proof script for this LEMMA written by the
ProofLite proof scripting notation. Each line of proof script is preceded by the
special comment %| −. The ProofLite utility proveit thms automatically installs
proof scripts into their respective formulas when processing the thms.pvs file, writes
the output into thms.out to show the result of proof.
Chapter 3
Generic Fault Tolerant Software
Architecture – GFTSA
In this chapter, we propose a novel heterogeneous software architecture, namely




Different from non-distributed systems, distributed systems may involves differ-
ent concurrent and interacting activities, which thus require a generic supporting
framework for controlling & coordinating those concurrent activities[61]. Two kinds
of concurrency are mostly discussed in this context: competitive, and cooperative.
Competitive concurrency indicates that concurrent activities compete for some
common resources, but without explicit cooperation. Cooperative concurrency
means that concurrent activities cooperate & communicate with each other[30].
Software architecture can provide a generic framework to guide the development
of distributed systems [10]. Software architecture styles, such as pipe-and-filter[2],
can only guide the development of distributed systems with cooperative concur-
rency. Some other basic software architecture styles, such as repository style[3], can
only guide the development of distributed systems with competitive concurrency.
However, many distributed systems involve both cooperative, and competitive con-
currency. We propose a novel heterogeneous software architecture, namely Generic
Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA), which combines several widely
used basic architecture styles to guide the development of distributed systems in-
volving both cooperative and competitive concurrency.
Due to no small measure to the complexity of distributed systems involving com-
petitive & cooperative concurrency, distributed systems are prone to fault and
errors. For the distributed systems with high reliability requirements, fault tol-
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erant techniques are necessary, which can provide a practical way to satisfy the
reliability requirements of such systems [62, 40, 83]. When faults occur and cause
exceptions in the distributed systems, their consequences may not always be lim-
ited to one system component [5]. Therefore, the fault tolerant techniques, which
are used to deal with the exceptions occurred in the distributed systems, may re-
quire stepping outside the boundaries of a computer system. The fault tolerant
techniques, namely idealized fault tolerant component [4, 41] and coordinated error
recovery mechanism[11, 24, 84, 61], are incorporated in GFTSA to facilitate the
recovery from exceptions that affect both the computer system, and its distributed
environment.
How to integrate fault tolerant techniques with functional aspects in the software
architecture level is a new research area that has recently gained considerable at-
tention. Existing work in this area mostly emphasizes the creation of fault toler-
ant mechanisms[32, 60, 63]; descriptions of software architectures with respect to
their reliability properties[66, 78, 33, 52]; and the evolution of component-based
software architectures by adding or changing components to guarantee reliability
properties[18, 25, 26, 27]. For our proposed software architecture, we incorporate
fault tolerant techniques in GFTSA in the early system design phase.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the illustration
of software architecture style involved in GFTSA, and the overall literal description
of GFTSA. Section 3 presents the fault tolerant techniques incorporated in GFTSA,
and illustrates how these fault tolerant techniques deal with the exceptions occurred
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in the distributed environment. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Software Architecture Style of GFTSA
The software architecture is the structure of the system, which comprises software
components, the externally visible properties of those components, and the rela-
tionships between them. In order to provide a generic framework to guide the de-
velopment of distributed systems involving cooperative & competitive concurrency,
we propose a novel heterogenous software architecture, namely Generic Fault Tol-
erant Software Architecture (GFTSA). GFTSA can help develop the distributed
system with the ability to tolerate faults, namely FTS (Fault Tolerant System),
which is composed of a set of Objects, a set of Connectors, a set of SharedResources,
and a CoordinatingComponent, as shown in Figure 3.1.
An architecture style defines a family of systems in terms of a pattern of structural
organization. This provide a vocabulary of components and connector types, and
a set of constraints on how they can be combined. The software architecture
style involved in GFTSA demonstrates how the component & connectors in the
FTS cooperate and compete with each together. In the following, we illustrate
the significant style of Object, connector, and SharedResource, which incorporates
several widely used software architecture styles.




























Figure 3.1: The generic fault tolerant software architecture.
3.2.1 Object
The Object involved in the FTS needs to implement independently task, and ex-
ecute concurrently with other different Objects. In the object-oriented organiza-
tion [28], data and their associated operations are encapsulated into an abstract Ob-
ject. This object-oriented organization makes the Object hide the implementation
details, which allows the Objects to be changed without affecting its others. There-
fore, we design the style of Object similar to the object-oriented organization, which
can accommodate the distributed environment. Derived from the object-oriented
organization, Object can encapsulate data representations, and their associated
primitive operations within a single component.
Accordingly, our proposed GFTSA can guide the development of distributed sys-
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tems with cooperative concurrency, since the Objects can execute in parallel with
other Objects. But the communication style of object-oriented organization is not
so suitable for the distributed environment. For an Object to interact with other
Objects, it must know the identity of other Objects.
3.2.2 Connector
Since the Objects need to execute concurrently in the distributed systems, we pro-
pose to design a communication pattern for the Object to accommodate the dis-
tributed environment. Referring to pipe-and-filter architecture [2], filters must be
the independent entities, and they do not need to know the identity of upstream
or downstream filters. They may specify input format and guarantee what appears
on output, but they may not know which components appears at the ends of those
pipes. Such pipe-and-filter style can support concurrent execution. Considering
the cooperative concurrency occurred in the distributed systems, the Objects also
do not need to know the identity of Objects which communicate with. Therefore,
we design Connectors in our proposed architecture to help the interaction among
Objects.
Similar to the pipe communication pattern in the pipe-and-filter architecture, the
Connectors in GFTSA connect the out port of one Object to the in port of another
Object. The cooperative concurrency is modelled by the Objects interacting with
each other via the Connectors to cater for common goals.
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3.2.3 SharedResource
In the distributed systems, the share resource, such as database recording the in-
formation, the entities occupied by several components, and etc, are widespread.
Therefore, we need to consider how these SharedResources can be accessed by dif-
ferent Objects to preserve the consistent states. Referring to the repository style [3],
there are two distinct components: a central data structure which represents the
current state, and a collection of independent components which operate on the
data-store. Derived from this style, we can design the Objects as the independent
components, and the SharedResources as the central data structure.
Since the SharedResource can be accessed by different Objects, we need to apply a
methodology to maintain the consist state of SharedResource, which implies that
the SharedResource need to guarantee the transaction semantics [24, 46]. The
transaction semantics indicates that at a given time, each SharedResource can only
be accessed by one Object. That Objects compete for SharedResource models the
competitive concurrency.
3.2.4 CoordinatingComponent
As GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of distributed systems with
high reliability requirements. GFTSA must preserve the ability to deal with
the exceptions occurring in the distributed environment. Different from the non-
distributed systems, the exceptions occurred in the distributed can affect not only
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the components which raise such exceptions, but also the components which inter-
act with these components. Therefore, we need to design an independent compo-
nent, namely CoordinatingComponent, to help deal with these exceptions.
The CoordinatingComponent is designed to help resolve the multiple exceptions
raised by different Objects in the distributed system. The CoordinatingComponent
can communicate with Objects and SharedResources involved in the distributed
system via transferring messages.
As shown in Figure 3.1, GFTSA provides a software architecture which involves
three kinds of components, namely Object, SharedResource, and CoordinatingCom-
ponent. The Object component can execute primitive task independently, and inter-
act with other Objects via connectors. The SharedResource component represents
the resources which can be occupied by several Objects. The CoordinatingCompo-
nent in particular can help deal with the exceptions occurring in the distributed
environment.
3.3 Fault Tolerant Techniques of GFTSA
If exceptions occur in the FTS, fault tolerant techniques need to deal with the
exceptions to satisfy the reliability requirements. Our proposed GFTSA incor-
porates fault tolerant techniques in the early system design phase, which can be
reused in the development of distributed systems with high reliability requirements.
Since the exceptions in the distributed environment are different from the ones in
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the non-distributed environment, the consequence of which may step outside the
boundaries of a computer system, the fault tolerant techniques involved in GFTSA
need to concern such characteristics of the exceptions.
3.3.1 The idealized fault tolerant component
The concern of fault tolerant properties in the designing of distributed systems
makes the development of such system more complicated. To ease such complexity,
we adopt the concept of idealized fault tolerant component [5, 8] in the Objects. By
incorporating such concept, the Object can include both normal and abnormal
processes to the interacting components within one single component, which could
minimize the impact on system complexity.
In the Object, the normal process is responsible for the execution of task, and the
abnormal process is responsible for dealing with the exceptions. The exception
context involved in the Object can be used in the abnormal process when facing
exceptions. The exception context has a set of exception handlers[16, 62], one of
which is called when its corresponding exception is raised. During the execution of
an Object, a checkpoint[12, 39] is used to record the latest normal execution state
of the Object. After calling the corresponding exception handler in the exception
context to deal with exceptions, the Object can either go to a normal state, or roll
back to the normal execution state recorded by the checkpoint. This solution is
scalable as it only requires extending the behavior of existing objects rather than
adding new objects to deal with exceptions.
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3.3.2 The coordinated error recovery mechanism
Because of the interactive and concurrent characteristic of distributed systems, the
exceptions occurring in one component of such systems can affect not only the com-
ponent raises the exception, but also the other components interacting with this
component. The Object using the idealized fault tolerant component technique can-
not handle such situation. We incorporate coordinated error recovery mechanism
in GFTSA to handle the exceptions which affect more than one component.
In order to distinguish the exceptions which affect the control flow of more than
one Object within the distributed system, from the exceptions whose influence is
limited within a single Object, we classify the exceptions raised in the Object into
two types: local exceptions, and global exceptions. The influence of a local
exception is limited within a single Object. Global exceptions, on the other hand,
affect the control flows of more than one Object within a distributed system. Once
a local exception is raised in one Object, the Object can call the corresponding
exception handler in its own exception context to cope with the exception. If this
exception cannot be handled successfully, a global exception is signalled, which can
be transferred to the CoordinatingComponent. If a global exception is originally
raised in an Object, this global exception is also passed to the CoordinatingCompo-
nent. The CoordinatingComponent broadcasts the global exception to the related
Objects & SharedResources within the distributed system. These components need
to replace the normal process with the abnormal process.
Different from non-distributed computing environment, we also need to consider
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how to deal with concurrently raised global exceptions in the distributed system.
In the coordinated error recovery mechanism, when several global exceptions are
raised in different Objects concurrently, these global exceptions are passed to the
CoordinatingComponent concurrently. The CoordinatingComponent uses excep-
tion graph[85, 86] mechanism to resolve these concurrently raised exceptions into a
unique global exception, namely universal exception, which covers all the raised
exceptions. When the CoordinatingComponent obtains the universal exception, it
propagates this exception to all the related Objects & SharedResources involved in
the distributed system. Furthermore, the Objects call the corresponding exception
handlers in their own exception contexts to deal with the exception. The state of
each SharedResource needs to be restored to its prior normal state.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel heterogeneous software architecture, namely
Generic Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA), to guide the development
of distributed systems with high reliability requirements. Several widely used soft-
ware architecture styles are combined in GFTSA to provide a generic framework to
the development of distributed systems involving cooperative & competitive con-
currency. These architecture styles include object-oriented organization, pipe-and-
filter architecture, and repository style. The styles of components and connectors
involved in GFTSA are all derived from these architecture styles. This chapter
presents the proposed GFTSA in a box-and-line fashion, accompanied with the
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literal illustration of basic features of components and connectors of GFTSA.
GFTSA incorporates fault tolerant techniques in the early system design phase to
satisfy the reliability requirements of distributed systems. Considering the charac-
teristics of exceptions occurred in the distributed environment, we mainly incorpo-
rate two kinds of fault tolerant techniques in GFTSA. The fault tolerant technique
idealized fault tolerant component can make Object of GFTSA have the ability to
deal with the local exceptions raised by itself or the resolved universal exception
passed by CoordinatingComponent. The fault tolerant technique coordinated error
recovery mechanism can help deal with a raised global exception or concurrently
multiple raised global exceptions in the distributed system. These fault tolerant
techniques can be reused in the development of distributed systems with high re-
liability requirements guided by GFTSA.
Chapter 4
Formal Modeling of GFTSA




GFTSA is proposed to provide a generic framework to guide the development of
distributed systems with reliability requirements. Good understanding and precise
representation of software architecture can lead to reliable system implementation
based on this architecture[22, 51]. The well-defined semantics & syntax make
formal modeling techniques suitable for precisely specifying, and formally verifying
architecture designs[45, 47, 69].
Z [77] is a formal language based on set theory and predicate logic, which can help
describe internal state transitions, and interface communications of a system by the
state and operation schema definitions. Many researchers [1, 71] have used Z to
formalize the state and computations of software architectures. Object-Z [20, 74]
is an extension of Z to accommodate the object-orientated style. Compared to
formal language Z, Object-Z can improve the clarity of large specifications through
enhanced structuring, and help the system designers to reuse the formal model
of GFTSA via inheritance & instantiation mechanisms. Timed Communicated
Object-Z (TCOZ) [48, 49, 50] is essentially a blending of Object-Z with Timed
CSP [67]. The essence of this blending is the identification of Object-Z opera-
tion specification with terminating CSP processes. TCOZ also could be a good
candidate for architecture description, which has been applied in the design and
verification of a generic Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system [79, 80]. Com-
pared to Object-Z, TCOZ is over expressed for our proposed architecture, but it
could be useful if our architecture is further extended to involve time.
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In this chapter, we formally model GFTSA by using the Object-Z language [88].
Following the semantics of Object-Z, the software architecture style and fault tol-
erant techniques involved in GFTSA can be specified precisely to provide explicit
features to the system designers. Since GFTSA is proposed to guide the develop-
ment of distributed systems with high reliability requirements, the crucial prop-
erties that GFTSA need to preserve are the fault tolerant properties. The fault
tolerant properties indicate that when exceptions occur, GFTSA has the ability to
deal with these exceptions and make the system recover to normal process. Based
on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we can formally reason about the fault tolerant
properties of GFTSA by using the reasoning rules of Object-Z[72, 73].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal
model of GFTSA represented by the Object-Z language. Section 3 presents several
significant fault tolerant properties of GFTSA, and demonstrates that GFTSA can
preserve these properties by formal reasoning. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Object-Z Model of GFTSA
The formal model of GFTSA can provide precise and explicit patterns & idioms to
the system designers by formally specifying the architecture style and fault tolerant
techniques involved in GFTSA. The components and connectors of GFTSA, shown
in Figure 3.1, are all represented as class schemas, which group the state and
operation schemas. The formal model of GFTSA is composed of Global Types,
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Object, Connector, CoordinatingComponent, ShareResource, and FTSystem class
schemas, according to the structure of GFTSA.
4.2.1 Global Types
The global types declared below can provide notations to the Object, Connector,
CoordinatingComponent, SharedResource, and FTSystem class schemas, which can
be used to associate type to the constants and variables declared in these class
schemas. The comments in the bracket can indicate the meaning of each type.
[PORT ] [port names used by Object to communicate]
[MSG ] [set of messages to be transmitted]
[OBSTATE ] [set of states that Object can be in]
[SRSTATE ] [set of states that SharedResource can be in]
[EH ] [set of exception handlers to deal with the exceptions]
RESULT ::= tolerate | stop [the result]
SIG == {0, 1} [the signal]
NORMAL : POBSTATE
[set of normal states that Object can be in]
LE : POBSTATE [set of local exceptions that Object can raise]
GE : POBSTATE [set of global exceptions that Object can raise]
Fail : OBSTATE [fail state that Object can be in]
NORMAL ∩ LE = ∅ ∧ NORMAL ∩GE = ∅ ∧ LE ∩GE = ∅
Fail 6∈ NORMAL ∪ LE ∪GE
OBSTATE = NORMAL ∪ LE ∪GE ∪ {Fail}
The NORMAL, LE, GE, and Fail declared in the axiomatic definition above are
four different states that the Object can be in. The predicate part of the axiomatic
definition specifies that the state of Object can be in such four states, and only be
in such four states.
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4.2.2 Fault Tolerant Component - Object
The Object class schema describes the features of Object in GFTSA, involving not
only the normal execution process but also the fault tolerant process of Object.
Since the behavior that the Object receives and sends messages is similar to the




Queue[↓ SharedResource][sr qlist/items , ans sr?/item?, to sr !/item!,
FromSR/Join,ToSR/Leave]
n states : PNORMAL
l excepts : PLE
g excepts : PGE
in ports , out ports : PPORT
comp msgs : PMSG
coop msg : PORT → MSG
transition : NORMAL× (PORT ×MSG)
→ OBSTATE × (PORT ×MSG)
except context : LE ∪GE 7→ EH
except handle : EH → OBSTATE
in ports ∩ out ports = ∅ ∧
n states ∩ l excepts ∩ g excepts = ∅
comp msgs ∩ ran coop msg = ∅
dom(dom transition)) ⊆ n states
dom(ran(dom transition)) ⊆ in ports ∧
dom(ran(ran transition)) ⊆ out ports
ran(ran(dom transition)) ⊆ ran coop msg ∧
ran(ran(ran transition)) ⊆ ran coop msg
dom except context ⊆ l excepts ∪ g excepts
inter state : OBSTATE
checkpoint : NORMAL
ue rec : SIG
inter state ∈ n states ∪ l excepts
∪g excepts ∪ {Fail}
checkpoint ∈ n states
Init
inter state ∈ n states
checkpoint = inter state
ue rec = 0
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Transition
∆(inter state, checkpoint)
inter state ∈ n states
checkpoint ′ = inter state
∃ p1, p2 : PORT ; m1,m2 : MSG |
inter state, (p1,m1)) ∈ dom transition
• (inter state ′, (p2,m2)) = transition(inter state, (p1,m1))
LocalExceptHandle
∆(inter state)
inter state ∈ l excepts
except handle(except context(inter state)) ∈ n states ⇒
inter state ′ = except handle(except context(inter state))
except handle(except context(inter state)) = Fail ⇒
inter state ′ ∈ g excepts
GlobalExceptPropagate
exception! : GE
inter state ∈ g excepts
ue rec = 0
exception! = inter state
UniExceptReceive
∆(inter state, ue rec)
uni exception? : GE
inter state ′ = uni exception?
ue rec′ = 1
UniExceptHandle
∆(inter state, ue rec, sr qlist)
inter state ∈ g excepts ∧ ue rec = 1
except handle(except context(inter state)) ∈ n states ⇒
inter state ′ = except handle(except context(inter state))
except handle(except context(inter state)) = Fail ⇒
inter state ′ = Fail
ue rec′ = 0 ∧ sr qlist ′ = 〈 〉
SRRequest
req ob! :↓ Object
req sr ! :↓ SharedResource
sr? :↓ SharedResource
inter state ∈ n states
comp msg 6= { }
req ob! = self ∧ req sr ! = sr?
FromSR
ans ob? :↓ Object
inter state ∈ n states
ans ob? = self
ToSR
msg ! : MSG
inter state ∈ n states
msg ! ∈ comp msgs
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inherit the Queue[Item] class schema by using instantiation and rename mecha-
nisms of Object-Z. The generic type Item of Queue[Item] is instantiated with class
schema type SharedResource. The items , item?, and item! are all be renamed
according to the specific requirements.
Firstly, we give a brief illustration to the constants declared in the local axiomatic
definition of Object class schema. The declared constants n states, l excepts,
and g excepts represent three different sets of states that an Object can be in: a
set of normal states, a set of local exception states, and a set of global exception
states. To model the idea that the IO-ports are directional, we partition ports
into a set of in ports, and a set of out ports. The declared constant comp msgs
represents a set of messages that an Object can transmit to the SharedResources.
We associate a message with a port in the coop msg, which indicates that the mes-
sage can be received or sent out from the associated port. The transition function
specifies that when an Object receives a message at its in port, the state of the
Object can be changed while sending out a message from its out port at the same
time. The except context function models that any exception occurred in the
Object has a corresponding exception handler. The function exception handle is
used to check whether the exception handler deals with the exception successfully.
The predicate part of the axiomatic definition imposes several constraints on the
declared constants.
The state schema in the Object class schema declares four variables: inter state,
checkpoint, ue rec, and sr qlist. The state of Object can be changed by changing
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these variables. The inter state denotes the current state of the Object, the check-
point records the normal execution state of Object, the ue rec indicates whether
the Object has received a universal exception from the CoordinatingComponent,
and the sr qlist records the identity of SharedResources, which are available for the
Object.
The Transition operation schema denotes the state transitions of the Object accord-
ing to the transition function. The LocalExceptHandle operation specifies how
the Object deals with local exception. The operation GlobalExceptPropagate,
UniExceptReceive, and UniExceptHandle denote how the Object implements
the coordinated error recovery mechanism.
The communication protocol among Objects and SharedResource need to guarantee
the transaction semantics. When an Object wants to access a SharedResource,
it needs to send an access request to this SharedResouce, which is specified in the
operation schema SRRequest. The FromSR operation describes that the Object
receives an answer from an available SharedResource. The ToSR operation de-
notes that the Object sends out the message, called msg!, to the assured available
SharedResource.
4.2.3 Connector
The Connector class schema describes that a connector of GFTSA is responsible
for connecting the send port of an Object to the receive port of another Object to
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transfer the message represented by msg. No operation occurs on the connectors.
In the predicate part of axiomatic definition, the declaration send ob, receive ob :↓
Object means that send ob, and receive ob refer to the Object class schema, or any
of its subclass schemas which are in the inheritance hierarchy rooted at the Object
class.
Connector
send port , receive port : PORT
∃ send ob, receive ob :↓
FTComponent ; msg : MSG |
send ob 6= receive ob ∧
send port ∈ send ob.out ports ∧
receive port ∈ receive ob.in ports
• msg = send ob.coop msg(send port) ∧
receive ob.coop msg(receive port) = msg
4.2.4 CoordinatingComponent
The CoordinatingComponent class schema describes how the CoordinatingCom-
ponent of GFTSA implements the coordinated error recovery mechanism when a
global exception is raised, or multiple global exceptions are raised concurrently.
Since the behavior of the CoordinatingComponent that it receives and sends excep-
tions is similar to the pattern of Queue system, the CoordinatingComponent class
schema inherits the Queue[Item] class schema by instantiating Item with the type
GE, and renaming items, item?, and item!.
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CoordinatingComponent
¹(Init,ExceptRec,ExceptGraph)
Queue[GE ][exceptions/items , exception?/item?,ExceptRec/Join]
except graph : seq1GE → GE
ExceptGraph
∆(exceptions)
uni exception! : GE
exceptions 6= 〈 〉
uni exception! = except graph(exceptions)
exceptions ′ = 〈 〉
The constant declared in the axiomatic definition, except graph, is a function
to resolve multiple concurrently raised exceptions into a universal exception,
namely uni exception, which can cover all the raised exceptions. The variable
exceptions represents the sequence of received exceptions from Objects. The oper-
ations ExceptRec, and ExceptGraph are responsible for receiving exception? from
Objects, resolving these received exceptions by the except graph, and sending out
the resolved exception uni exception! to the Object and SharedResource.
4.2.5 SharedResource
The SharedResource class schema models how the SharedResource of GFTSA can
guarantee the transaction semantics when receiving messages from Objects, and
preserve consistent state when facing exceptions. Since the behavior that the Share-
dResource receives and sends messages is similar to the pattern of Queue system,
the SharedResource class schema also inherits the Queue[Item] schema by using
the instantiation & rename mechanisms of Object-Z.
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In the axiomatic definition, the declared constant states represents a set of states
that the SharedResource can be in, and function trans is used to model the state
SharedResource
¹(Init,ObList ,Available,Trans,Except)
Queue[↓ Object ][ob qlist/items , req ob?/item?,
ans ob!/item!,ObList/Join,Available/Leave]
states : P SRSTATE
trans : SRSTATE ×MSG → SRSTATE
dom(dom trans) = ran trans ⊆ states
semaphore : SIG
sr state : SRSTATE
checkpoint : SRSTATE
sr state ∈ states ∧ checkpoint ∈ states
Init
semaphore = 0
checkpoint = sr state
ObList
req sr? :↓ SharedResource
req sr? = self
Available
∆(semaphore)
ans sr ! :↓ SharedResource
semaphore = 0 ∧ ans sr ! = self




to sr? :↓ SharedResource
msg? : MSG
semaphore = 1 ∧
to sr? = self
sr state ′ =
trans(sr state,msg?)
checkpoint ′ = sr state ′
semaphore ′ = 0
Except
∆(semaphore,
ob qlist , sr state)
uni exception? : GE
semaphore ′ = 0
ob qlist ′ = 〈 〉
sr state ′ = checkpoint
transition of the SharedResource when it receives a message from an Object. The
state variables semaphore, ob qlist, sr state, and checkpoint represent the sig-
nal to show whether the SharedResource is accessed by an Object, the request
list of Objects, the current state of SharedResource, and the recorded prior nor-
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mal state of SharedResource respectively. The ObList operation specifies that the
SharedResource receives an access request from an Object. The Available opera-
tion models that the SharedResource sends out a signal to the Object, when the
SharedResource is available. The Trans operation specifies the state transitions of
SharedResource according to the trans function when receiving msg? from an Ob-
ject. The Except operation describes that the state of SharedResource needs to roll
back to the normal state recorded in the checkpoint when facing a uni exception?.
4.2.6 Fault Tolerant System - FTSystem
The FTSystem class schema describes how the components & connectors in GFTSA,
which constitute a FTS (Fault Tolerant System), are synchronized. In the local
axiomatic definition, the declared constant critical represents the set of Objects
whose Fail state can cause the whole FTS to stop, and Result Control is a func-
tion to check the execution result of FTS. If the state of any critical Object is not
in the Fail state, the execution result of FTS is tolerate, which means that the FTS
can recover from the exceptions; otherwise the whole FTS has to stop execution.
The instances of components & connectors in the FTS are all declared in the state
schema. The secondary variable ob fail records a set of Objects in the Fail state.
The SystemRecover operation models that the states of all Objects in the FTS
should be initialized, when the execution result of FTS is tolerate. The Transition
operation expression is the conjunction of Transition operations of all Objects in
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FTSystem
critical : P ↓ Object
Result Control : P ↓ Object → RESULT
∀ fobs : P ↓ Object • ∃ fob : fobs •
fob ∈ critical ⇒ Result Control(fobs) = stop
∀ fobs : P ↓ Object • ∀ fob : fobs •
fob 6∈ critical ⇒ Result Control(fobs) = tolerate
obs : P ↓ Object
cs : P ↓ connector
coco :↓ CoordinatingComponent
srs : P ↓ SharedResource
∆
ob fail : P ↓ Object
∀ ob1, ob2 : obs • ob1 6= ob2
∀ ob : obs ; pt : PORT | pt ∈ ob.out ports •
∃1 c : cs • pt = c.send port
∀ ob : obs ; pt : PORT | pt ∈ ob.in ports •
∃1 c : cs • pt = c.receive port
∀ ob : obs | ob.inter state = Fail •
ob ∈ ob fail
Init
∀ ob : obs • ob.Init
coco.Init
∀ sr : srs • sr .Init
SystemRecover
Result Control(ob fail) = tolerate
∀ ob : obs • ob.Init
Transition =̂ ∧ob : obs • ob.Transition
ExceptPropagate =̂ ∧ob : obs •
ob.GlobalExceptPropagate ‖ coco.ExceptRec
ExceptGraph =̂ coco.ExceptGraph ‖
(∧ob : obs • ob.UEReceive ∧ ∧sr : srs • sr .Except)
ObReqSR =̂ ∧ob : obs • ob.SRReq ‖ ∧(sr : srs • sr .ObList)
SRAnsOb =̂ ∧sr : srs • sr .Available ‖ (∧ob : obs • ob.FromSR)
ObAccSR =̂ ∧ob : obs • ob.ToSR ‖ (∧sr : srs • sr .Trans)
the FTS. The operation ExceptPropagate specifies that, when global exceptions
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are raised in the Objects, these Objects need to pass the exceptions to the Coordi-
natingComponent by the parallel operator ‖ to compose two operations together.
The ExceptGraph operation specifies that the CoordinatingComponent sends the
resolved exception uni exception! to all the Objects & SharedResources. The op-
erations ObReqSR, SRAnsOb, and ObAccSR are used to model how the Objects
compete for the SharedResources.
4.3 Reasoning about GFTSA
The formal model of GFTSA specifies the software architecture style and fault
tolerant techniques involved in GFTSA in a precise and compact way by using the
Object-Z language. Since GFTSA is used to help design distributed systems with
high reliability requirements, GFTSA needs to preserve fault tolerant properties to
satisfy such requirements. In this section, we reason about [65] GFTSA to demon-
strate that GFTSA can preserve fault tolerant properties. The process of reasoning
needs to use reasoning rules of Object-Z[72, 73] to prove that fault tolerant proper-
ties can be derived from the Object-Z model of GFTSA. The following items show
that GFTSA can preserve significant fault tolerant properties, which are expressed
as theorems.
1. When a global exception is raised by an Object in the FTS, all of the Objects,
and SharedResources in the FTS can deal with this exception. This property
can be formally expressed as follows.
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Theorem
FTS :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state ∈ ob.g excepts `
∀ ob : obs ; sr : srs • ob.ue rec′ = 1 ∧
sr .sr state ′ = sr .checkpoint
As an intermediate step, it is useful to think of the proof strategy infor-
mally. When a global exception is raised in an Object, the Object can use
GlobalExceptPropagate operation to send this global exception out to the
CoordinatingComponent, and the CoordinatingComponent can use the Ex-
ceptRec operation to receive this global exception. Two operations are com-
bined in the ExceptPropagate operation expression declared in the FTSystem
class schema. Because the sequence exceptions is not empty, the Except-
Graph operation in the CoordinatingComponent class schema sends out the
uni exception!. The UEReceive operation in the Object, and the operation
Except in the SharedResource can receive the uni exception?, which is ex-
pressed in the ExceptGraph operation declared in the FTSystem class schema.
When an Object receives the uni exception?, the value of ue rec is changed to
1. When a SharedResource receives the uni exception?, its sr state rolls back
to the normal state recorded in the checkpoint. These transformations assure
that the Objects, and SharedResources are informed about the exception. In
the following, a formal proof based on this strategy is constructed.
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Proof
FTSystem :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state
∈ ob.g excepts ` ob.GlobalExceptPropagate
FTSystem :: ob : obs | obs ∈ P ↓ Object `
ob ∈↓ Object
Object :: GlobalExceptionPropagate `
exception! = inter state
FTSystem ` ExceptPropagate
FTSystem ` coco.ExceptRec
FTSystem ` coco ∈↓ CoordinatingComponent
CoordinatingComponent ` exceptions ′ =
exceptions a 〈exception?〉
CoordinatingComponent :: ExceptGrahp |
exceptions 6= 〈 〉 `
uni exception! = except graph(exceptions)
FTSystem ` ExceptGraph
FTSystem :: ob : obs ` ob.UEReceive
FTSystem :: sr : srs ` sr .Except
Object :: UEReceive ` ue rec′ = 1
SharedResource :: Except `
sr state ′ = checkpoint
FTSystem :: ob : obs ; sr : srs ` ob.ue rec′ = 1
∧ sr .sr state ′ = sr .checkpoint
2. If an Object in the FTS raises a local exception, the other Objects except
this one in the FTS are not influenced, and still in their normal states. This
property can be formally expressed as follows.
Theorem
FTS :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state ∈ ob.l excepts `
∀ other ob : obs | other ob 6= ob •
other ob.inter state ∈ other ob.n state
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The proof strategy is described first. When a local exception is raised by
an Object, the LocalExceptHandle operation in the Object class is executed
to handle this exception. If this local exception is handled successfully, the
state of Object recovers to a normal state. Otherwise, the state of Object is
changed to a global exception state. There is no communication between this
Object and other Objects. The other Objects except this one are still in their
normal states, which cannot be influenced by the raised local exception. In
the following, a formal proof based on this strategy is constructed.
Proof
FTSystem :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state ∈
ob.l excepts ` ob.LocalExceptionHandle
FTSystem :: ∃ ob : obs | obs ∈ P
↓ Object ` ob ∈↓ Object
Object :: ExceptionHandle `
inter state ′ ∈ n states
∨ inter state ′ ∈ g excepts
FTSystem ` ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n states ∨
ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.g excepts
FTSystem :: other ob : obs | other ob 6= ob `
other ob.inter state 6= ob.inter state ′
FTSystem :: ∀ other ob : obs | other ob 6= ob
` other ob.inter state ∈ other ob.n state
3. When two global exceptions are raised concurrently by two different Objects in
the FTS, all the Objects in the FTS need to be informed about the universal
global exception. This property can be formally expressed as follows.
Theorem
FTSystem :: ob1, ob2 : obs |
ob1.inter state = ob1.g excepts
∧ ob2.inter state = ob2.g excepts ∧ ob1 6= ob2 `
∀ ob : obs • ob.ue rec′ = 1
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When two global exceptions are raised concurrently in the FTS, each Ob-
ject can use GlobalExceptPropagate operation to send its global exception out
to the CoordinatingComponent, and the CoordinatingComponent can use the
ExceptRec operation to receive these two global exceptions. The GlobalExcept-
Propagate, and ExceptRec operations are combined in the ExceptPropagate
operation expression declared in the FTSystem class schema. Because the se-
quence exceptions is not empty, the ExceptGraph operation can use the func-
tion except graph to get the uni exception, which covers the two global excep-
tions. After that, the uni exception! is sent out to all the Objects in the FTS.
The UEReceive operation in the Object class can receive this uni exception?.
The operations ExceptGraph, and UEReceive are combined in the Except-
Graph operation expression declared in the FTSystem class schema. When
an Object receives the uni exception?, the value of ue rec is changed to 1,
which means that the Object is informed about the exceptions. In the fol-
lowing, a formal proof based on this strategy is constructed.
Proof
FTSystem :: ob1 : obs | ob1.inter state =
ob1.g excepts ` ob1.GlobalExceptPropagate
FTSystem :: ob1 : obs | obs ∈ P ↓ Object
` ob1 ∈↓ Object
FTSystem :: ob2 : obs | ob2.inter state =
ob2.g excepts ` ob2.GlobalExceptPropagate
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FTSystem :: ob2 : obs | obs ∈ P ↓ Object `
ob2 ∈↓ Object
Object :: GlobalExceptionPropagate `
exception! = inter state
FTSystem :: ob1 : obs | ob1.inter state =
ob1.g excepts ` exception! = ob1.inter state
FTSystem :: ob2 : obs | ob2.inter state =
ob2.g excepts ` exception! = ob2.inter state
FTSystem ` ExceptPropagate
FTSystem :: ob1 : obs | ob1.inter state =
ob1.g excepts ` exception! = ob1.inter state
FTSystem :: ob2 : obs | ob2.inter state =
ob2.g excepts ` exception! = ob2.inter state
CoordinatingComponent ` ExceptRec
CoordinatingComponent :: ExceptRec `
exceptions ′ = exceptions a 〈
ob1.inter state, ob2.inter state〉
CoordinatingComponent :: exceptions ′ 6= 〈 〉 `
ExceptGraph
CoordinatingComponent :: ExceptGraph
` uni exception! = except graph(exceptions ′)
FTSystem ` ExceptGraph
Object ` UEReceive
FTSystem :: ob : obs | obs ∈ P ↓ Object `
ob ∈↓ Object
Object :: UEReceive ` ue rec′ = 1
FTSystem :: ob : obs ` ob.ue rec′ = 1
4. When a non-critical Object fails, the FTS can tolerate this fault, which means
that the states of all Objects in the FTS can recover to their normal states.
This property can be formally expressed as follows.
Theorem
FTSystem :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state = Fail ∧
ob 6∈ critical `
∀ ob : obs • ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n states
First, we give the informal proof description. When the state of an Object is
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Fail, if this Object is not in the state critical declared in the FTSystem class
schema, we can gain the execution result, namely tolerate, by using function
Result Control. Because the execution result is tolerate, the SystemRecover
operation is used to reset the states of all Objects to the initial states, which
means that all the Objects recover to normal states. A formal proof based on
the previous description is shown in the following.
Proof
FTSystem :: ∃ ob : obs | ob.inter state = Fail ∧
ob 6∈ critical ` ob fail = {ob} ∧
ob 6∈ critical
FTSystem :: ob fail = {ob} ∧
ob 6∈ critical `
Result Control(ob fail) = tolerate
FTSystem ` Result Control(ob fail) = tolerate
FTSystem :: Result Control(ob fail) = tolerate
` SystemRecover
FTSystem ` SystemRecover
FTSystem :: SystemRecover ` ∀ ob : obs • ob.Init
FTSystem :: ob : obs ` ob.Init
FTSystem :: ob : obs ; obs : P ↓ Object ` ob ∈↓ Object
Object :: Init ` inter state ∈ n states
FTSystem :: ob : obs ` ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n states
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we formally model the proposed GFTSA, a novel heterogenous
software architecture, by using the Object-Z language. The Object-Z model of
GFTSA can provide explicit & common idioms to the system designers. Since
Object-Z is the class construct which groups the definition of a state schema and
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the definitions of its associated operation schemas, we represent the components
and connectors in GFTSA as corresponding class schemas. In each class schema,
we formally model the static and dynamic features of component or connector.
As GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of distributed systems with high
reliability requirements, we incorporate the idealized fault tolerant component and
coordinated error recovery mechanism in the architecture. To model the ideal-
ized fault tolerant component, the Object class schema declares abnormal states
& exception handler functions in the axiomatic definition, and exception handler
operations, which are all used to indicate how Object deals with exceptions. The
CoordinatingComponent class schema models the coordinated error recovery mech-
anism. The SharedResource class schema also specifies the exception handler op-
eration and how to guarantee the transaction semantics.
Based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we formally reason about several sig-
nificant fault tolerant properties to verify that GFTSA can satisfy the reliability
requirements. The formal reasoning process involves that we can derive the fault




This chapter investigates to build a template based on the Object-Z model of
GFTSA. By customizing this built template, we can auto-generate the Object-Z




The Object-Z model of GFTSA can provide precise and common idioms & patterns
to the system designers. How the Object-Z model of GFTSA can be customized in
the development of distributed systems is the next issue we need to tackle. Since
the inheritance & instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z can help the customiza-
tion, each class schema in the Object-Z model of GFTSA can be inherited by the
corresponding class schema of developed systems.
Besides inheriting corresponding class schema in the Object-Z model of GFTSA,
each class schema of developed systems also needs to be specified according to
system requirements. The specifications could involve defining visible list, declar-
ing new constants and predicates in the axiomatic definition, defining the initial
state schema or new operation schemas, and etc, which could not be supported
by the inheritance & instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z. In order to make the
customization process more efficient, we investigate to build a template based on
the class schemas in the Object-Z model of GFTSA. The class schemas in the
template involve not only inheriting and instantiating corresponding class schemas
in the Object-Z model of GFTSA, but also other specifications which cannot be
supported by the inheritance & instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z. By cus-
tomizing the class schemas in the built template, we can generate the Object-Z
models of developed systems. The customization process could be small or large
change to the class schemas in the template. Since the granularity of customization
is flexible, in order to make the customization process automatic, we investigate
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to apply XML-based Variant Configuration Language (XVCL) technique to the
customization process.
XML-based Variant Configuration Language (XVCL)[36, 75, 35, 89] is a meta-
programming technique developed to facilitate building flexible, adaptable, and
reusable software artifacts. When developing an XVCL solution, we partition
a problem description(e.g. a software specification, or a software program) into
generic, adaptable meta-components called x-frames. Following the mechanisms of
XVCL, we build our proposed template as primitive x-frames. The Textual Con-
tent of x-frames is written as the combination of Object-Z specification and XVCL
commands. XVCL commands mark the anticipated variation points in x-frames,
injecting flexibility into their Textual Contents. When developing a distributed
system with high reliability requirements, we firstly compose x-frames for the de-
veloped system by adapting the x-frames in the template. Based on the composed
x-frames, we can auto-generate the Object-Z model of the developed system by
running the XVCL processor. A case study of Sales Control System (SCS) [87] is
presented to illustrate the customization process. Following the reasoning rules of
Object-Z, we can formally verify that the generated Object-Z model of SCS can
preserve the fault tolerant properties.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a template
for customization, which is built based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA by using
the XVCL technique. Section 3 presents a case study of SCS to illustrate how to
generate the Object-Z model of SCS automatically from the built template, and
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formally reason about the fault tolerant properties of SCS based on the generated
model by following the reasoning rules of Object-Z. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Template based on Object-Z model of GFTSA
GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of distributed systems with high
reliability requirements. By using the inheritance & instantiation mechanisms of
Object-Z, the Object-Z model of GFTSA can be customized into the models of de-
veloped distributed systems. During the customization process, besides inheriting
and instantiating corresponding class schemas in the Object-Z model of GFTSA,
the class schemas in the model of developed systems also need to be specified ac-
cording to system requirements. These specifications cannot be supported by the
reuse mechanisms of Object-Z. The following class schemas inherit and instanti-
ate corresponding class schema in the Object-Z model of GFTSA. The items in
quotation marks of these class schemas can be instantiated according to system
requirements. The comments in the brackets clarify the meaning of these items.
“objectname”




[operation schema rename option]
“newfunction”
[inserted new function declaration]
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“newvar”
[inserted new constant variable declaration]
n states = {“nstates”} [set of normal state name]
l excepts = {′′lexcepts”} [set of local exception name]
g excepts = {“gexcepts”} [set of global exception name]
in ports = {“inports”} [set of input port name]
out ports = {“outports”} [set of output port name]
comp msgs = {“compmsgs”} [messages to SharedResource]
coop msg = {“coopmsg”} [messages to other Objects]
“newvarpredicate” [predicate of new constant variable]
“transition” [concrete description of transition function]
except context = {“exceptcontext”} [except context predicate]
except handle = {“excepthandle”} [except handle predicate]
Init
inter state = “inistate” [initial state of Object]
“newop” [inserted new operation schema]
“connectorname”
[customized Connector class name]
Connector
send port = “s port” [sending port name]




“egraph” [description of except graph function]
“srname”
[customized SharedResource class name]
¹(Init,ObList ,Available,Trans,Except)
SharedResource
states = {“states”} [set of normal state name]
trans = {“trans”} [concrete description of trans function]
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“systemname”
[customized FTSystem class name]
FTSystem
“in component” : “component” [component instance]
obs = {“obsnames”} [customized Object instance set]
cs = {“csnames”} [customized Connector instance set]
coco = “coconame” [customized CC instance]
srs = {“srnames”} [customized SharedResource instance set]
By instantiating the items in quotation marks of the class schemas shown above,
we can generate the Object-Z models of develop distributed systems. In order to
make this process more automatic, we investigate to build these class schemas as a
template. Since the granularity of those items in quotation marks is flexible, XML-
based Variant Configuration Language (XVCL) [36, 35, 75, 89] can be applied to
help us build the template. XVCL is a meta-programming technique developed to
facilitate building flexible, adaptable, and reusable software artifacts. All of small
or large variation points can be represented as meta-expressions, which can be in-
stantiated during the customization process according to the specific requirements.
Following the mechanism of XVCL, we build the template as generic, adaptable
fragments, called x-frames. Each x-frame is an XML file combining the Object-Z
specification and XVCL commands. The x-frames for the template is composed
according to the five class schemas above, namely object, connector, coco, sr, and
ftsystem. In these x-frames, each item in quotation marks is represented as a
variable. The XVCL commands, such as 〈 the value of expr=“?@var?”/〉, 〈 break〉,
and 〈 ifdef 〉, are used to mark this variable to help the adaption in the customization
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process. As shown in Figure 5.1, we finish the first step for customization that is
building the template based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA by applying the
XVCL technique. In the following, the x-frames of the built template are briefly




















Figure 5.1: The customization process.
5.2.1 The x-frame for the fault-tolerant component-Object
The object x-frame is built for the fault-tolerant component Objects of developed





\also Object <ifdef var="rename">
[<value-of expr="?@rename?"/>]\\
</ifdef> <ifndef var="rename">\\















In this x-frame, the items in quotation marks of “objectname” class schema are
marked by the XVCL commands, which are represented as variables in the 〈 〉.
These variables can be instantiated according to specific system requirements.
5.2.2 The x-frame for Connector
The connector x-frame is built for the Connectors of developed distributed systems.
We compose this x-frame according to the “connectorname” class schema.
<x-frame name="connector" language="latex">
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\begin{class}{<value-of expr="?@connector_name?"/>}








The items in quotation marks of “connectorname” class schema are expressed as
variables in the XVCL command value-of. The s port and r port represent the
sending port name and receiving port name correspondingly, which are used by
Objects to communicate with each other.
5.2.3 The x-frame for CoordinatingComponent
The coordatingcomponent x-frame is built for the CoordinatingComponents of de-











The item e graph is expressed as variable in the XVCL commands break, which can
be instantiated via adaption by inserting the declaration of except graph function.
5.2.4 The x-frame for SharedResource
The sharedresource x-frame is built for the SharedResources of developed dis-
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The items in quotation marks of “srname” class schema are expressed as variables
in the XVCL command value-of. The states represents a set of normal state that
SharedResource can be in. The trans represents the trans function, which is used
to declare the state transition of SharedResource.
5.2.5 The x-frame for Fault Tolerant System-ftsystem
The ftsystem x-frame is built for the synchronization of components and connec-
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</x-frame>
The items in quotation marks of “systemname” class schema are expressed as
variables, which are marked by the XVCL command value-of. These variables can
be instantiated according to the specific system requirements.
5.3 A Case Study-Sales Control System (SCS)
GFTSA is proposed to provide a generic framework to guide the development of
distributed systems with high safety requirements. The Object-Z model of GFTSA
can provide explicit idioms & patterns to the system designers. A template is built
to help the customization from the Object-Z model of GFTSA to the models of
developed systems. In this section, a case study of Sales Control System (SCS) is
presented to demonstrate how GFTSA can guide the high level system design of
distributed systems with high safety requirements.
5.3.1 Sales Control System (SCS)
The distributed system Sales Control System (SCS) [7, 87] is designed to maintain
a database describing all the products to be sold so that many distributed sales
points can obtain the correct prices of the items selected by the customers, which
needs to satisfy a high reliable requirements. The SCS consists of a database, a set
of control points and a set of sales points. Figure 5.2 shows an example of SCS,
which is composed of two control points, a database and three sales points.












Figure 5.2: The Sales Control System.
A control point provides the interface that allows the human manager of the system
to update the product information in the database at run time. We assume that
such updating is regarded as a very critical activity and consequently, to guard
against fraud, the policy is that the senior control point needs to monitor and, if
necessary, to correct the updates made by the junior control point. Therefore, the
senior and junior control points cooperate with each other to update the database.
The database stores product information which can be accessed by control and sales
points. This competitive concurrency needs to guarantee the transaction semantics
of the database.
According to the box-and-line patterns of GFTSA shown in Figure 3.1, the SCS is
composed of five Objects, called SeniorControl, JuniorControl, SalesPointA, Sale-
sPointB, SalesPointC and a SharedResource, called Database. Two Connectors,
called SJC and JSC, are used to assist the communication between SeniorControl
and JuniorControl. A CoordinatingComponent, called CC, is also involved in the
SCS to implement coordinated error recovery mechanism.
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5.3.2 Generation of Formal Model of SCS
Based on the description of SCS, we investigate to develop the formal model of SCS
by customizing the built template. The five primitive x-frames in the template can
be customized via adaption. The adaption implies that a new x-frame for one com-
ponent in the developed system can be built based on the corresponding primitive
x-frame in the template by using XVCL command 〈 adapt 〉, and instantiating the
variation points.
Building x-frames for Formal Model of SCS
We build x-frames for the formal model of SCS based on the primitive x-frames
of the built template, as a step shown in the customization process of Figure 5.1.














Figure 5.3: The x-frame Adaption Relationship of SCS.
The sc, jc, spa, spb, and spc x-frames are built for SeniorControl, JuniorControl,
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SalesPointA, SalesPointB, and SalesPointC correspondingly. The sjc and jsc x-
frames are built for the connectors SJC and JSC correspondingly. The database
x-frame is built for the Database and the cc x-frame is built for the CC component.
The scs x-frame is built to describe how these components & connectors synchro-








In this jsc x-frame, we adapt connector x-frame in the template of GFTSA, and
set values to the variables defined in the connector x-frame. The JSC is the name
of the connector, and also the name of the class schema for this connector, which is
set to the variable connector name. The JSC Out and JSC In are the names for
sending port and receiving port of the JSC connector, which are set to the variables
s port and r port. The composition of all other x-frames follow such mechanisms.
The fscs SPC is the root of x-framework for SCS, which adapts all of the ten
x-frames built for SCS. During x-framework processing, the XVCL processor inter-
prets the XVCL commands contained in the fscs SPC, traverses an x-framework,
performs adaption by executing XVCL commands embedded in x-frames, and emits
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the formal model of SCS to the fscs.tex file.
Formal Model of SCS
By running the XVCL processor, we can auto-generate the Object-Z model of SCS.
Figure 5.4 shows the model design of SCS in the box-and-line fashion guided by





















Figure 5.4: GFTSA Architecture View of SCS.
We use a representative class schema JuniorControl to illustrate the features of the
Object-Z model of SCS. The JuniorControl class represents the Objects in the SCS
which describes how the JuniorControl point interacts with SeniorControl point to
update the product information stored in the Database, and how to deal with local
and global exceptions. The JuniorControl class schema inherits the Object class
schema. The local exception NetworkDisconnected defined in l excepts represents
that the network cannot work when the JuniorControl point is waiting for the
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authorization from the SeniorControl point. A Local ExceptHandle function is
defined to handle this exception. After the network can work, the JuniorControl
point needs to send the RequestUpdate to the SeniorControl point again.
The global exception InformationLost represents that the Database has lost some
product information. A Global ExceptHanle function is defined to handle this
exception. The JuniorControl point needs to recover the product information in
the Database. The Trans function defines not only the normal state transitions,





Local ExcepthHandle : OBSTATE → (PORT ×MSG)





n states = {NormalProcess,AuthorizeRequest}
l excepts = {NetworkDisconnected}
g excepts = {InformationLost}
in ports = {SJC In}
out ports = {JSC Out}
comp msgs = {ProductUpdate}
coop msg = {(SJC In,UpdateApproved),
(JSC Out ,RequestUpdate)}
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Trans = {((NormalProcess, (NULL,NULL)),
(AuthorizeRequest , (JSC Out ,RequestUpdate))),






except context = {(NetworkDisconnected ,Local ExceptHandle),
(InformationLost ,Global ExceptHandle)}
except handle = {(Local ExceptHandle,AuthorizeRequest),
(Global ExceptHandle,NormalProcess)}
Init
inter state = NormalProcess
5.3.3 Reasoning about SCS
By customizing our built template based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we
can auto-generate the formal model of SCS. Since the SCS has high safety require-
ments that when exceptions raised, the SCS can deal with these exceptions, the
formal model of SCS needs to preserve fault tolerant properties. We can formally
reason about the fault tolerant properties based on the Object-Z model of SCS.
The process of reasoning needs to derive fault tolerant properties from the gener-
ated model of SCS by using the reasoning rules of Object-Z [72]. The following
items show that SCS can preserve significant fault tolerant properties, which are
expressed as theorems.
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1. When the InformationLostA is raised in the SalesPointA, which represents
that the SalesPointA cannot get the product information from the Database,
the SCS can tolerate this exception. This property can be formally expressed
as follows.
Theorem
SCS :: spa.inter state = InformationLostA `
∀ scs : SCS ; ob : scs .obs •
ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n state
As an intermediate step, it is useful to informally think of proof strategy.
When a global exception, namely InformationLostA, is raised in the Sales-
PointA, the SalesPointA can use GlobalExceptPropagate operation to send
this global exception out to CC and CC can use ExceptRec operation to re-
ceive this global exception. Two operations are combined in the ExceptProp-
agate operation expression declared in SCS class schema. Since the sequence
exceptions is not empty, the ExceptGraph operation in the CC class sends
out the uni exception!. The UEReceive operation in each FTComponent of
SCS can receive this uni exception?, which is expressed in the ExceptGraph
operation declared in the SCS class schema. When each FTComponent of
SCS receives the uni exception?, the state is changed to normal state. These
transformations assure that FTComponents in the SCS can handle the global
exception. Formal proof based on this strategy is constructed in the following.
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Proof
SCS ` spa.inter state = InformationLostA
SCS ` spa ∈ SalesPointA
SalesPointA ` InformationLostA ∈ g excepts
SalesPointA :: inter state ∈ g excepts `
GlobalExceptPropagate
SCS ` spa.GlobalExceptionPropagate
SalesPointA :: GlobalExceptionPropagate `
exception! = inter state
SalesPointA ` exception! = InformationLostA
SCS ` ExceptPropagate
SCS ` coco.ExceptRec
SCS ` coco ∈ CC
CC :: ExceptRec ` exceptions ′ =
exceptions a 〈InformationLostA〉
CC :: exceptions ′ 6= 〈 〉 ` ExceptGraph
CC :: ExceptGraph `
uni exception! = except graph(exceptions ′)
= InformationLost
SCS ` ExceptGraph
SCS :: ob : obs ` ob.UEReceive
SCS :: obs : P ↓ FTComponent ` ob ∈↓ FTComponent
FTComponent :: UEReceive ` ue rec′ = 1 ∧
inter state ′ = uni exception?
= InformationLost
FTComponent :: ue rec = 1 ∧ inter state =
uni exception? ` UniExceptHandle
FTComponent :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context(InformationLost))
SCS ` {jc, sc, spa, spb, spc} ∈ P ↓ FTComponent
SalesPointA :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
JuniorControl :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
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(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SeniorControl :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SalesPointB :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SalesPointC :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SCS :: scs : SCS ; ob : scs .obs `
ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n state
2. When the InformationLostA is raised in the SalesPointA, and concurrently
the InformationLostB is raised in the SalesPointB, the SCS can also handle
these two concurrent global exceptions and recover system to normal state.
Theorem
SCS :: spa.inter state = InformationLostA ∧
spb.inter state = InformationLostB
` ∀ scs : SCS ; ob : scs .obs •
ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n state
When the InformationLostA raised in SalesPointA and the InformationLostB
raised in SalesPointB concurrently, each of them can use GlobalExceptProp-
agate operation to send the exception out to the CC and the CC can ex-
ecute the ExceptRec operation to receive these two global exceptions. The
GlobalExceptPropagate and ExceptRec operations are combined in the Except-
Propagate operation expression declared in the SCS class schema. Because
the sequence exceptions is not empty, the ExceptGraph operation in the CC
class schema can send out the uni exception! which covers Information-
LostA and InformationLostB. The UEReceive operation in each FTCompo-
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nent of SCS can receive this uni exception?. Two operations ExceptGraph
and UEReceive are combined in the ExceptGraph operation expression de-
clared in the SCS class schema. When each FTComponent in the SCS re-
ceives the uni exception?, the state is changed to normal state. Following is
the formal proof based on this strategy.
Proof
SCS ` spa.inter state = InformationLostA ∧
spb.inter state = InformationLostB
SCS ` spa ∈ SalesPointA ∧ spb ∈ SalesPointB
SalesPointA ` InformationLostA ∈ g excepts
SalesPointA :: inter state ∈ g excepts
` GlobalExceptPropagate
SalesPointB ` InformationLostB ∈ g excepts
SalesPointB :: inter state ∈ g excepts
` GlobalExceptPropagate
SCS ` spa.GlobalExceptionPropagate ∧
spb.GlobalExceptionPropagate
SalesPointA :: GlobalExceptionPropagate
` exception! = inter state
SalesPointB :: GlobalExceptionPropagate
` exception! = inter state
SalesPointA ` exception! = InformationLostA
SalesPointB ` exception! = InformationLostB
SCS ` ExceptPropagate
SCS ` coco.ExceptRec
SCS ` coco ∈ CC
CC :: ExceptRec ` exceptions ′ = exceptions
a〈InformationLostA,
InformationLostB〉
CC :: exceptions ′ 6= 〈 〉 ` ExceptGraph
CC :: ExceptGraph ` uni exception!
= except graph(exceptions ′)
= InformationLost
SCS ` ExceptGraph
SCS :: ob : obs ` ob.UEReceive
SCS :: obs : P ↓ FTComponent ` ob ∈↓ FTComponent
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FTComponent :: UEReceive ` ue rec′ = 1 ∧
inter state ′ = uni exception?
= InformationLost
FTComponent :: ue rec = 1 ∧
inter state = uni exception? ` UniExceptHandle
FTComponent :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle
(except context(InformationLost))
SCS ` {jc, sc, spa, spb, spc} ∈ P ↓ FTComponent
SalesPointA :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SalesPointB :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SalesPointC :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
JuniorControl :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SeniorControl :: UniExceptHandle ` inter state ′ =
except handle(except context
(InformationLost)) = NormalProcess
SCS :: scs : SCS ; ob : scs .obs `
ob.inter state ′ ∈ ob.n state
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate to build a template based on the Object-Z model
of GFTSA by using the XVCL technique, which can help auto-generate the formal
models of developed distributed systems guided by GFTSA via customization. Fol-
lowing the XVCL mechanism, the template is built as generic, adaptable x-frames,
which are written as the combination of Object-Z specification and XVCL com-
mands. When developing a distributed systems with high reliability requirements,
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we can just compose x-frames for this system by adapting the x-frames in the built
template. By running the XVCL processor, we can generate the Object-Z model
of developed system from these composed x-frames automatically.
A case study of SCS is presented to illustrate the customization process. Guided
by the pattern of GFTSA, we can design the structure of SCS. According to the
built template, we compose specific x-frames for SCS by adapting corresponding x-
frame and instantiating the variables in the corresponding x-frame. A fscs SPC file
is built to compose all the specific x-frames together. By running XVCL processor
with fscs SPC, we can generate formal model of SCS automatically. In order
to demonstrate that the developed system guided by GFTSA preserves the fault
tolerant properties, we formally reason about the fault tolerant properties of SCS by
using the reasoning rules of Object-Z. The formal reasoning demonstrates that the
developed system guided by GFTSA can satisfy the high reliability requirements.
Chapter 6
Mechanical Verification of GFTSA
This chapter presents the mechanical verification of fault tolerant properties of
GFTSA by using the theorem prover of PVS, and a template which is built based





In order to provide a generic framework for the development of distributes systems
with high reliability requirements, we have proposed a Generic Fault Tolerant Soft-
ware Architecture (GFTSA). Since GFTSA incorporates fault tolerant techniques
to deal with the exceptions, GFTSA can preserve fault tolerant properties. Based
on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we can formally reason about the fault tolerant
properties of GFTSA. These formal reasoning involves showing that the fault tol-
erant properties, expressed as theorems, can be derived from the Object-Z model
of GFTSA by using the reasoning rules of Object-Z. Though Object-Z model of
GFTSA can provide precise analysis and documentation to the users, since Object-
Z lacks of tool support for mechanical verification, the formal reasonings about
GFTSA we have done are all manual-based, which are laborious and error-prone.
Thus, we investigate to use prover to mechanically verify the fault tolerant prop-
erties of GFTSA. Prototype Verification System (PVS)[57, 59, 68, 58] is a good
candidate for us, because the theorem prover of PVS can provide mechanical proof
support for the verification.
The Prototype Verification System (PVS) is a proof system developed at SRI. PVS
has a powerful interactive theorem prover and its automation suffices to prove many
results automatically. PVS differs from most other interactive theorem provers in
the power of its basic steps which can be decision procedure for automatic rewriting,
induction, and other relatively large units of deduction. PVS differs from other
highly automated theorem provers in being directly controlled by the user. PVS
6.1. INTRODUCTION 77
has been applied successfully to large and difficult application in both academic
and industrial settings[31, 64].
As the theorem prover of PVS only supports the model in the PVS specification
language, we need to embed GFTSA model in PVS. One way we can do is that we
encode the whole set of Object-Z notations into PVS. However, it is tedious and
arduous to take all the Object-Z semantics into account and construct Object-Z
semantics in PVS properly. As our focus is the mechanical verification of GFTSA,
instead, we suppose to just embed the Object-Z model of GFTSA in PVS.
We can develop safety critical distributed systems guided by GFTSA. The de-
veloped systems guided by GFTSA also can preserve the fault tolerant properties.
Since the theorem prover of PVS only supports the mechanical verification of model
in PVS specification language, we need to get the PVS models of developed sys-
tems. Based on the PVS model of GFTSA, we can generate the PVS models of
safety critical distributed systems via customization. Following the customization
methodology which is used in the generation of Object-Z models of developed sys-
tems guided by GFTSA, we can build a template for the customization by using
the XVCL technique. The template is composed of primitive x-frames importing
the theories in the PVS model of GFTSA. By customizing this template, we can
generate the PVS models of developed systems automatically. Based on the gen-
erated PVS models, the theorem prover of PVS can mechanically verify the fault
tolerant properties of such models.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
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the formal model of GFTSA in PVS specification language. Section 3 presents
the mechanical verification of fault tolerant properties of GFTSA. In section 4,
a template is built based on the PVS model of GFTSA. Section 5 concludes the
chapter.
6.2 PVS Model of GFTSA
The formal model of GFTSA in Object-Z can provide an explicit features of GFTSA
to the system designers in a compact and understandable way [88]. Since Object-Z
lacks of tool support for mechanical verification, in order to provide a mechanical
proof support for the verification of fault tolerant properties, we embed the GFTSA
model in the PVS environment to use the theorem prover of PVS.
The Object-Z model of GFTSA is composed of generic types and several class
schemas for components & connectors of GFTSA. The PVS specification language
supports modularity and reuse by means of parameterized theories. Therefore, the
class schemas for components & connectors of GFTSA can be built as theories. A
theory consists of a series of declarations, which provide names for types, constants,
variables, axioms, and formulas. We still use the Queue system as an example,
which has been used to illustrate the basic features of Object-Z in Section 2.1, to
explain the basic features of PVS specification language.
queue [ Item: TYPE+ ] : THEORY
BEGIN
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i: VAR nat






empty: items=(#size:=0, elements:=(LAMBDA (j:{i|i<0}):e)#)





The queue theory is generic with the parameter Item. The Item is declared as
an uninterpreted and nonempty type. The items is declared as a record type. In
the type of items, the size and elements are two fields of this type. The i, itms,
item are all declared as variables associated with specific types. The e is declared
as a constant associated with Item type. The nonemptyqueue? is declared as a
predicate of itms, which also could be used as a type. Two join and leave operations
are declared to specify that one item joins and leaves the queue, associated with
the change of size and elements fields. The queue theory can be reused later to
specify object, coordinatingcomponent, and sharedresource theories.
Similar to the structure of Object-Z model of GFTSA, the PVS model of GFTSA
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also includes global type, object, connector, coordinatingcomponent, shareresource,
and ftsystem theories, which will be presented in the following sections. We can
use typecheck tool of PVS to check for semantic errors of such PVS model.
6.2.1 Generic Type
These declared types can be used to declare constants and variables in the following
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The PORT is an uninterpreted and nonempty type to represent the ports used
by Objects to communicate with each other. The MSG is an uninterpreted and
nonempty type to represent the communicated messages. The OBSTATE and
SRSTATE represent the states of Objects and SharedResources correspondingly.
The EH represents the exception handler. The RESULT and SIG are two enu-
meration type declarations. The OBID, SRID, CONID, and CCID are declared to
represent the identifications of Object, SharedResource, Connector, and Coordinat-
ingComponent correspondingly. After giving these types, we do not need to define
these types in the following theories.
6.2.2 CoordinatingComponent
The coordinatingcomponent theory describes how the CoordinatingComponent in
GFTSA implements the coordinated error recovery mechanism when a global ex-
ception is raised in an Object or multiple global exceptions are raised concurrently
in different Objects. The coordinatingcomponent theory imports the generictype




except_graph: [items[OBSTATE] -> OBSTATE]
exception: OBSTATE
CC: TYPE=[#exceptions: items[OBSTATE], uni_exception:OBSTATE#]












In the coordinatingcomponent theory, the except graph is declared as a function to
resolve several concurrently raised global exceptions into an universal exception,
namely uni exception. The ExceptRec function is declared to represent how the
coordinatingcomponent receives exception from Objects. The ExceptGraph function
is responsible for resolving these received exceptions by the except graph to the
uni exception.
6.2.3 Fault-Tolerant Component-Object
The object theory describes the stable activities, and error recovery activities of
Object component, which represents the fault-tolerant components in GFTSA. The
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object imports the generictype theory, the parameterized queue theory instantiated
with type [SRID], and coordinatingcomponent theory.
object: THEORY
BEGIN





transition: [[OBSTATE, [PORT -> MSG]] -> [OBSTATE, [PORT -> MSG]]]
except_context: [OBSTATE -> EH]










IF member(inter_state(ob),g_excepts) AND ue_rec(ob)=0 THEN
inter_state(ob)
......





IF member(inter_state(ob), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(ob)=1 THEN
......
END object
In the object theory, the declared constants n states, l excepts, and g excepts rep-
resent three different sets of states that an Object can be in: a set of normal states,
a set of local exception states, and a set of global exception states. The transition
function specifies the state change of an Object when receiving or sending the mes-
sages to other Objects. The except context function is declared to model that any
exception occurring in the Object has a corresponding exception handler. The func-
tion exception handle is used to check whether the exception handler deals with
the exception successfully. The Transition function denotes the state transitions
of an Object according to the transition function. The LocalExceptHandle function
specifies how the Objects deals with local exception. The GlobalExceptPropagate,
UniExceptReceive, and UniExceptHandle denote how the Object implements the
coordinated error recovery mechanism.
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6.2.4 Connector
The connector imports the generictype and object theories. The connector theory
describes that the Connector in GFTSA is responsible for connecting send port of
a send ob and receive port of another receive ob to transfer the message. These














The sharedresource theory models how the SharedResource can guarantee the trans-
action semantics when receiving messages from Objects and preserve consistent
state when facing exceptions. The shareresource imports the generictype theory,
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IMPORTING generictype, queue[OBID], object, coordinatingcomponent
states: setof[SRSTATE]
trans: [[SRSTATE, MSG] -> SRSTATE]
SR: TYPE=[#semaphore: SIG, ob_qlist:(nonemptyqueue?[OBID]),





















Referring to the SharedResource class schema in the Object-Z model of GFTSA,
the constants states, trans declared in the axiom definition are also declared as con-
stants associated with specific types. These constants all have the same meaning as
illustrated in the SharedResource class schema. The variables declared in the state
schema of Object-Z model of GFTSA are declared as the fields in the SR record
type. The ObList function specifies that the SharedResource receives access request
from an Object. The Available function models that when the SharedResource is
available, how it sends out a signal to the Object. The Trans function specifies the
state transitions of SharedResource according to the trans function. The Except
function describes that the state of SharedResource need to roll back to the normal
state recorded in the checkpoint when facing exceptions.
6.2.6 Fault-Tolerant System-ftsystem
The ftsystem theory imports all the theories for the components & connector of
GFTSA. Several formulas, such as Propagate which can be used in the mechanical
verification of properties, all can be declared in this theory. The properties which
need to be verified are all declared as LEMMA in this theory, such as pred1 ft.
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ftsystem: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING object, connector, coordinatingcomponent, sharedresource
......
Propagate: AXIOM
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The Propagete AXIOM means that when a global exception raised in an Object, it
will send out this exception. The ExceptPropagate and NonEmpty AXIOMS specify
that, when CoordinatingComponent receives the global exception, the exception
list will be nonempty. The Lemmas pred1 ft to pred4 ft are four significant fault
tolerant properties that GFTSA can preserve, which can be mechanically verified
by the theorem prover of PVS. The mechanical verification of these properties will
be illustrated in the next section.
6.3 Mechanical Verification of GFTSA using PVS
Since GFTSA is used to help develop safety critical distributed systems, the verifi-
cation of GFTSA mainly involves showing that GFTSA can preserve fault tolerant
properties, which are expressed as LEMMA. For each LEMMA, we build a proof
tree by inputting proof commands until each branch of the tree is proved to be
true. In the following, several significant fault tolerant properties and their proof
scripts are presented to illustrate the mechanical verification of GFTSA by using
the theorem prover of PVS.
6.3.1 A Global Exception raised in a Fault-tolerant Com-
ponent
When a global exception is raised by an Object in the FTS, all of the Objects in
the FTS should be informed about the exception. During the proof of pred1 ft
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property, which is firstly shown in the consequent {1}, we can use primitive proof
commands in response to the Rule? prompt from PVS theorem prover to prove
this property interactively. These primitive proof commands could be flatten, prop,
and assert etc, which can help the proofs more automatically and systematically.




{1} (EXISTS (obj: Object):
member(inter_state(obj), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj) = 0)
IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: Object), (ccp: CC):
inter_state(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) =
except_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(ccp))))
Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
sequent, this simplifies to:
pred1_ft :
{-1} (EXISTS(obj: Object):
member(inter_state(obj), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj) = 0)
|-------
{1} (FORALL (obj: Object), (ccp: CC):
inter_state(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) =
except_graph(exceptions(ExceptRec(ccp))))
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......
Rule?: (lemma "Propagate") Applying Propagate this
simplifies to:
pred1_ft :
{-1} FORALL (obj: Object):
member(inter_state(obj), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj) = 0 IMPLIES
GlobalExceptPropagate(obj) = inter_state(obj)
[-2] member(inter_state(obj!1), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj!1) = 0
|-------




Rule? : (prop) Applying propositional simplification, which is
trivially true. Q.E.D.
The (flatten) command eliminates the disjunctive connectives in the consequent
{1} of pred1 ft so as to flatten it out into the sequent. The next proof command
(skolem!) is used to replace the existentially quantified variable obj in the an-
tecedent {-1} with constant obj!1. The following proof step (lemma “Propagate”)
is used to bring in an instance of the “Propagate” as an antecedent sequent formula.
By prompting these PVS primitive proof commands, we can move on to complete
the verification of this property successfully.
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6.3.2 Two Global Exceptions raised Concurrently in Fault-
tolerant Components
When two global exceptions are raised concurrently by two different Objects in
the FTS, all the Objects in the FTS need to be informed about a universal global
exception. This pred2 ft property is firstly shown as the consequent {1} in the
theorem prover of PVS.
The proof script for this property starts with the application of (flatten) to the
given conjecture followed by (skolem!) command to replace the existentially
pred2_ft :
|-------
{1} (EXISTS (obj1, obj2: Object):
member(inter_state(obj1), g_excepts) AND
ue_rec(obj1) = 0 AND
member(inter_state(obj2), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj2) = 0)
IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: Object), (ccp: CC):
ue_rec(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) = 1)
Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
.......
Rule?: (skolem!) Skolemizing, this simplifies to:
pred2_ft :
{-1}member(inter_state(obj1!1), g_excepts) AND
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ue_rec(obj1!1) = 0 AND
member(inter_state(obj2!1), g_excepts) AND ue_rec(obj2!1) = 0
|-------
[1] (FORALL (obj: Object), (ccp: CC):
ue_rec(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) = 1)
.......
Rule?: (lemma "ExceptPropagate") Applying ExceptPropagate this
simplifies to:
pred2_ft :
{-1} FORALL (obj: Object): exception =GlobalExceptPropagate(obj)
[-2] GlobalExceptPropagate(obj2!1) =inter_state(obj2!1) [-3]
GlobalExceptPropagate(obj1!1) =inter_state(obj1!1)
|-------
[1] (FORALL (obj: Object), (ccp: CC):
ue_rec(UniExceptReceive(obj, ccp)) = 1)
Rule?: (instantiate -1 ("obj1!1"))
.......
Rule? : (prop) Applying propositional simplification, which is
trivially true. Q.E.D.
quantified variable. The following strategy in the proof script is to bring in the
declared LEMMAS to make the consequent in the sequent to be true. These
LEMMAS involve “Propagate”, ”ExceptPropagate”, “NonEmpty”, “CCReceive”,
“ExceptGraph”, and “UniExcept”, which have already been proved to be true. The
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strategy of these LEMMAS can be described as follows. When two global excep-
tions are raised concurrently in the FTS, each Object can use GlobalExceptProp-
agate function to Propagate its global exception to the CoordinatingComponent,
and the CoordinatingComponent can use the ExceptRec function to receive these
two global exceptions. Because the record exceptions is not empty, the Except-
Graph function can use the function except graph to get the uni exception. After
that, the uni exception is sent out to all the Objects in the FTS. The UEReceive
function in the Object can receive this uni exception. When an Object receives the
uni exception, the value of ue rec is changed to 1, which means that the Object is
informed about the exceptions.
6.3.3 A Local Exception raised in a Fault-tolerant Compo-
nent
If an Object in the FTS raises a local exception, the other Objects are not influenced
and convince to be in their stable states. This pred3 ft property is firstly shown as
the consequent {1} in the theorem prover of PVS.
pred3_ft :
|-------
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Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
........
Rule?: (lemma "NonEquVar1") Applying NonEquVar1 this simplifies
.......
Rule?: (lemma "NonEquVar2") Applying NonEquVar2 this simplifies
to:
pred3_ft :
{-1} FORALL (obj1, obj2: Object):
obj1 /= obj2 IMPLIES inter_state(obj1) /= inter_state(obj2)





Rule?: (assert) Simplifying, rewriting, and recording with
decision procedures, Q.E.D.
The proof script for this property starts with the application of (flatten) to the
given conjecture followed by (skolem!) command to replace the existentially quan-
tified variable. After that, the LEMMAS “NonEquVar1”, “NonEquVar2”, “Lo-
calExcept1”, and “LocalExcept2” are brought in to the antecedent of the sequent.
The proof strategy of these LEMMAS can be described as follows. When a local
exception is raised in an Object, the other Objects will have different state from
this Object. Because the raised exception is a local exception, no exception will be
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sent out to the CoordinatingComponent. Therefore, the states of other Objects will
still be normal.
6.3.4 Fault-tolerant System recover From non-critical Fault-
tolerant component Failure
When a non-critical Object fails, the FTS can tolerate this fault, which means
that the states of all Objects in the FTS can recover to their normal states. This
pred4 ft property is firstly shown as the consequent {1} in the theorem prover of
PVS.
The proof script for this property starts with the application of (flatten) to the given
conjecture followed by (skolem!) command to replace the existentially quantified
variable. The following proof steps mainly bring in “syspred2”, and
pred4_ft :
|-------
{1}(FORALL (fobs: setof[OBID]): disjoint?(fobs, critical)) IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: Object), (fobs: setof[OBID]):
systemrecover(obj, fobs) = Init)
Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
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{1} (FORALL (obj: Object), (fobs: setof[OBID]):
systemrecover(obj, fobs) = Init)
Rule?: (skolem!) Skolemizing, this simplifies to:
.........
Rule?: (lemma "syspred2") Applying syspred2 this simplifies to:
pred4_ft : {-1} FORALL (fobs: setof[OBID]):
disjoint?(fobs, critical) IMPLIES Result_Control(fobs) = tolerate
[-2] disjoint?(fobs!1, critical)
|-------
[1] systemrecover(obj!1, fobs!1) = Init
Rule?: (instantiate -1("fobs!1"))
........
Rule?: (lemma "Recover") Applying Recover this simplifies to:
pred4_ft :
{-1} FORALL (fobs: setof[OBID], obj: Object):
Result_Control(fobs) = tolerate IMPLIES
systemrecover(obj, fobs) = Init
.......
Rule?: (prop) Applying propositional simplification, which is
trivially true.Q.E.D.
“Recover” to make the consequent in the sequent to be true. The proof strategy of
these LEMMAS can be described as follows. When the state of an Object is Fail,
if this Object is not in the state critical, we can gain the execution result, namely
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tolerate, by using function Result Control. Because the execution result is tolerate,
the SystemRecover function is used to reset the states of all Objects to the initial
states, which means that all the Objects recover to normal states.
6.4 Template based on PVS Model of GFTSA
GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of safety critical distributed systems.
The developed systems guided by GFTSA can preserve fault tolerant properties.
By using the theorem prover of PVS, we can mechanically verify the fault toler-
ant properties. As the theorem prover of PVS only supports the model in PVS
specification language, we need to generate the PVS models of developed systems.
Based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we have built a template to make the
generation of Object-Z models of distributed systems more efficient by using the
XVCL technique. Following the similar XVCL technique, we investigate to build a
template to help the generation of PVS models of developed systems based on the
PVS model of GFTSA.
This template is built as generic and adaptable x-frames, which are all written
as the combination of PVS specification and XVCL commands. In each primitive
x-frame, besides importing corresponding theories in the PVS model of GFTSA,
all of small or large variation points are represented as meta-expressions, which can
be instantiated during the customization process according to the specific require-
ments. In the following, we will present these primitive x-frames involved in the
6.4. TEMPLATE BASED ON PVS MODEL OF GFTSA 99
template, which are constants, connector, cc, sr, object, and system.
6.4.1 The x-frame for global constants
The constants x-frame is built for the global constants which can be used in the
declared formulas of other theories. This theory imports the generictype theory in









In this x-frame, the ports represents the in port and out port used to transmit the
messages among Objects. The gobstates represents the states of Object. The msgs
represents the messages transmitted among Objects and SharedResource.
6.4.2 The x-frame for connector
The connector x-frame is built for the connector theories of specific safety critical
distributed systems. This theory imports the connector theory in the PVS model
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receive_port: PORT=<value-of expr="?@r_port?"/> END
<value-of expr="?@connectorname?"/>
</x-frame>
In this x-frame, the s port represents the sending port of the Connector, and the
r port represents the receiving port of the Connector. The connectorname repre-
sents the Connector name of the specific system.
6.4.3 The x-frame for coordinatingcomponent
The cc x-frame is built for the coordinatingcomponent theory of specific safety
critical distributed system. This theory imports the coordinatingcomponent theory
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ge: VAR items[OBSTATE]
except: OBSTATE




In this x-frame, the egraph variable in the 〈 break〉 represents a function, which is
used to resolve the concurrently raised exceptions into a universal exception. The
ccname represents the CoordinatingComponent name of the developed system.
6.4.4 The x-frame for sharedresource
The sr x-frame can be adapted to build the sharedresource theory of specific safety
critical distributed system. This theory imports the sharedresource theory in the













In this x-frame, the srstates represents the states that the SharedResource can be
in. The srstatedeclare represents the declaration of the states in the srstates. The
srtransaxiom represents the AXIOM declaration for the state transitions. The
srname represents the SharedResource name of specific system.
6.4.5 The x-frame for object
The object x-frame can be adapted to build the Objects theories of specific safety
critical distributed systems. This theory imports the object theory in the PVS
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obinistate: OBSTATE=<value-of expr="?@inistate?"/> \\
END <value-of expr="?@objectname?"/>
</x-frame>
In this primitive x-frame, the exceptionhandlenames represents the exception han-
dler function used in the Object. The sobstates represents the normal states that
the Object can be in. The nstatesdeclare represents the declaration of normal
states of Object. The lexceptdeclare and gexceptdeclare represent the local excep-
tional and global exceptional states that the Object can be in. The inportsdeclare,
outportsdeclare, compmsgsdeclare, and coopmsgsdeclare represent the declaration
of in port, out port, competitive messages and cooperative messages. The transi-
tionaxiom, exceptioncontextaxiom, excepthandleaxiom represent the AXIOM dec-
larations about the state transition, exception context function, and except handle
function correspondingly.
6.4.6 The x-frame for ftsystem
The system can be adapted to build the ftsystem theory of specific safety critical
distributed system. This theory imports the built theories for the components &











In this x-frame, the componentnames represents the theories which need to be im-
ported in the ftsystem theory. The lemmas and predicates represents the transition
and fault tolerant properties of specific system, which are declared as LEMMAS.
By instantiating the variables defined in these x-frames according to specific re-
quirements, we can generate the PVS model of developed system guided by GFTSA.
In the next Chapter of Mechanical Verification of developed Safe Critical Dis-
tributed Systems guided by GFTSA, we will present case studies to illustrate the
customization from such built template.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we embed the GFTSA model in PVS to achieve mechanical ver-
ification support for reasoning about fault tolerant properties. The component &
connectors of GFTSA all are represented as theories, which constitute a theory
chain by importing. Based on the PVS model of GFTSA, we can mechanically ver-
ify the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA by virtue of the theorem prover of PVS.
When we verify a property in PVS, firstly we formalize this property as a LEMMA,
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then we can input primitive proof commands to the theorem prover interactively
to verify this LEMMA until the proof result is true. The mechanical verification of
GFTSA can guarantee that GFTSA can preserve fault tolerant properties.
Since GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of safety critical distributed
systems, we investigate to build a template based on the PVS model of GFTSA.
This template can be used to help the generation of PVS models of developed




Distributed Systems guided by
GFTSA
This chapter presents a template for the specification and proof scripts of devel-
oped safety critical distributed systems guided by GFTSA, and two case studies to




The Generic Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA) is proposed to guide
the development of safety critical distributed systems. In order to achieve mechani-
cal verification support for reasoning about the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA,
we have embedded the GFTSA model in the PVS theorem prover. Based on the
PVS model of GFTSA, we can mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of
GFTSA by using the theorem prover of PVS. Since the developed safety critical
distributed systems guided by GFTSA need to preserve the fault tolerant proper-
ties, the theorem prover of PVS also can help such verification. As the theorem
prover of PVS only supports the models in the PVS specification language, we need
to get the PVS models of developed systems. A template has been built based on
the PVS model of GFTSA to generate the PVS models of developed systems. In
this chapter, we present a case study of Line Direction Agreement System (LDAS)
to illustrate how we can generate the PVS model of LDAS from the built template
via customization, and the mechanical verification of fault tolerant properties of
LDAS by using the theorem prover of PVS. During the mechanical verification of
LDAS, the theorem prover of PVS needs to be applied primitive proof commands
interactively under user guidance. In order to make such verification more efficient,
we investigate to use the batch mode of PVS in the verification.
The primitive proof commands input by user to verify one specific property can
constitute the proof script for this property. In the batch mode of PVS, we can
apply the proof script directly to the theorem prover of PVS to verify one specific
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property, which does not require inputting each primitive proof command interac-
tively. By customizing the generic proof scripts, we can generate the proof scripts
for the developed safety critical distributed systems, and apply them to the the-
orem prover to verify the fault tolerant properties of developed systems in batch
mode. The ProofLite [53] technique can provide user-friendly interface of batch
mode execution and interactive proof scripting notation to the system designers.
As the proof scripting notation supported by ProofLite enables a semi-literate
proving style where specification and proof scripts reside in the same context, we
investigate to extend our built template to involve generic fault tolerant properties
accompanying with generic proof scripts by using XVCL and Prooflite techniques.
By customizing this template, we can generate both PVS models, and proof scripts
for the developed systems. A case study of an Electric Power System (EPS) [14] is
presented to illustrate the customization process and mechanical verification.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
a case study of LDAS to illustrate how we can generate the PVS model of LDAS
from the template based on the PVS model of GFTSA, and mechanically verify the
fault tolerant properties of LDAS by using the theorem prover of PVS. Section 3
presents the extension of the template based on PVS model of GFTSA, which
involves not only PVS specification, but also generic proof scripts for the fault
tolerant properties. Section 4 presents a case study of Electronic Power System
(EPS) to demonstrate that we can generate the specification and proof scripts
for fault tolerant properties of specific system by customizing the built template.
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Section 5 concludes the paper.
7.2 Case Study-LDAS (Line Direction Agreement
System)
In the Section 6.4, we have built a template based on the PVS model of GFTSA.
In this section, we use a case study of LDAS to demonstrate how the PVS model
of LDAS can be generated from this template. Based on the generated PVS model
of LDAS, we can mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of LDAS.
7.2.1 Line Direction Agreement System(LDAS)
The Line Direction Agreement System (LDAS) [17], a safety critical distributed
system, is designed to control the line direction to prevent the head-on train crashes
on the line. Each station communicate with LDACS (Line Direction Agreement
Control System) to guarantee that, at a time, only one train runs on the line
connecting two stations. The operator in each station can command the station.
Figure 7.1 shows a part of LDAS, composed of three stations. The overall LDAS
can be much more complex comprising of several stations, and communication
paths.
In the system under consideration, StatonA and StationB communicate with LDACS
to control the direction of LineAB. Similarly, StationB and StationC communicate
































Figure 7.1: The LDAS System.
with LDACS to control LineBC. We can consider StationA, OperatorA, LDACS,
StationB, and OperatorB to be a relatively independent sub-system that can be
analyzed in isolation, as it has the requirement for both cooperative & competitive
concurrency, even in isolation. The interaction pattern in the other sub-systems,
e.g., the system comprising of StationB and StationC follows the same regulation
as the above mentioned case.
According to the box-and-line patterns of GFTSA shown in Figure 3.1, the LDAS
sub-system is composed of five Objects, called StationA, OperatorA, LDACS, Sta-
tionB, OperatorB, and a SharedResource, called LineAB. Six connectors are used
to assist the communication among the Objects. A CoordinatingComponent called
CC is also involved in the LDAS to implement the coordinated error recovery mech-
anism.
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7.2.2 The Generation of LDAS Formal Model
In order to mechanically verify that LDAS can satisfy the high safety requirements
by using the theorem prover of PVS, we need to generate the PVS model of LDAS
from the built template, presented in the Section 6.4. The six primitive x-frames
in the template of GFTSA can be reused during the customization via adaptation.
Following the mechanisms of XVCL, the adaptation means that a new x-frame for
one component in the specific system is built based on the corresponding primitive

















Figure 7.2: The x-frame Adaption Relationship of LDAS.
We can build x-frames for the PVS model of LDAS based on the primitive x-frames
of template. Figure 7.2 describes x-frame adaptation relationship between the
LDAS, and the template. The ldasconstant is built to declare the global constants
which will be used by other theories involved in the PVS model of LDAS. The sa,
sb, ldacs, oa and ob x-frames are built for StationA, StationB, LDACS, OperatorA
and OperatorB correspondingly. The osa, sal , lsa, lsb, sbl, and osb x-frames are
built for six connectors in the LDAS. The ldascc x-frame is built for CC component
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and the line x-frame is built for LineAB component. The ldas x-frame is built to
describe how these components and connectors synchronize. By running XVCL
processor with gsa SPC file which adapts all of the 15 x-frames of LDAS, we can
generate PVS model of LDAS automatically. Figure 7.3 shows the model design of























Figure 7.3: GFTSA architecture view of LDAS sub-system.
Several representative theories is presented to illustrate the features of PVS model
of LDAS.
The sa theory
The sa theory represents the Object component in the LDAS which describes how
the StationA interacts with other Object & SharedResource, and how to deal with
local & global exceptions.















in_ports: setof[PORT]={x:PORT|x=LSA_In OR x=OSA_In}
out_ports: setof[PORT]={x:PORT|x=SAL_Out}


















The sa theory imports object and ldasconstant theory. A forward recovery func-
tion is defined to handle exceptions. The APointClose, AskedOpen, AskedClose and
AskedOpen are four normal states. The input exception, bothopen exception and
output exception are three exceptional states. The local exception input exception
declared in l excepts represents that the StationA cannot handle the received mes-
sages. The global exception bothopen exception represents that both StationA and
StationB can open the gates. The global exception bothclose exception represents
that both StationA and StationB can close the gates. The messages associated
with the port of Object are declared in the AXIOM of coop msg. When receiv-
ing messages from other Objects, the state of StationA could be transformed from
one normal state to either another normal state or an exceptional state, which are
declared in the AXIOM declaration of transition. We use the forward recovery
to handle bothopen exception and bothclose exception, which are declared in the
AXIOM of except context. When we use the forwar recovery to handle the ex-
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ceptions, the state of StationA will be recovered to the APointOpened state, which
declared in the AXIOM of except handle.
The ldas Theory
How the component & connectors in the LDAS cooperate with each other is de-




























inter_state(obj1)=bothopen_exception AND ue_rec(obj1)=0 AND




The ldas theory imports all the theories for the components & connectors of LDAS.
Several significant properties of LDAS are declared as LEMMA. Several LEMMAS
are shown in the ldas theory as example. The StationA prop LEMMA represents
that when raising a global exception, the StationA needs to use GlobalExcept-
Propagate operation to send this exception to the CoordinatingComponent. The
ldacs UniExceptRec2 LEMMA represents that when the LDACS receives the re-
solved uni exception from the CoordinatingComponent, the inter state and ue rec
of LDACS will be changed to uni exception and 1. The ldas ft1 and ldas ft2 are
two signification fault tolerant properties that LDAS can preserve. By using the
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theorem prover of PVS, we can mechanically verify these properties successfully.
7.2.3 Mechanical Verification of LDAS
Based on the generated PVS model of LDAS, we can mechanically verify the fault
tolerant properties of LDAS by using the theorem prover of PVS. Two significant
fault tolerant properties ldas ft1 and ldas ft2 are presented as LEMMA in the ldas
theory. The proof scripts for these two properties are presented in the following.
Facing bothopen Exception
When the bothopen exception is raised in the StationA, the LDAS can tolerate
this exception which means that any other Object, such as LDACS, can handle this
exception and recover to normal execution process. This ldas ft1 property is firstly
shown as the consequent {1} in the theorem prover.
ldas_ft1 :
|-------
{1} (EXISTS (obj: stationA.Object):




Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
sequent, this simplifies to:
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ldas_ft1 :
{-1} (EXISTS(obj: stationA.Object):
inter_state(obj) = bothopen_exception AND ue_rec(obj) = 0)
|-------
{1} (FORALL (obj: ldacs.Object):
member(inter_state(UniExceptHandle(obj)), ldacs.n_states))
Rule?: (skolem!) Skolemizing, this simplifies to:
ldas_ft1 :
{-1} inter_state(obj!1) = bothopen_exception AND ue_rec(obj!1) =0
|-------
[1] (FORALL (obj: ldacs.Object):
member(inter_state(UniExceptHandle(obj)), ldacs.n_states))
Rule?: (lemma "stationA_member") Applying member this simplifies
.......
Rule? (instantiate -1 ("obj!1" "ccp!1"))
Instantiating the top quantifier in -1 with the terms:




ue_rec(UniExceptReceive(obj!1, ccp!1)) = 1
IMPLIES
inter_state(obj!1) = ldacs.uni_exception AND ue_rec(obj!1) = 1
[-2] inter_state(UniExceptReceive(obj!1, ccp!1)) =
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ldacs.uni_exception [-3] ue_rec(UniExceptReceive(obj!1, ccp!1)) =1
[-4] ldacs.uni_exception = bothopen_exception
|-------
[1] (FORALL (obj: ldacs.Object):
member(inter_state(UniExceptHandle(obj)), ldacs.n_states))
Rule? (assert) Simplifying, rewriting, and recording with decision
procedures, Q.E.D. Run time = 4.00 secs. Real time = 178.88 secs.
The proof script for this property starts with the application of (flatten) to the
given conjecture followed by (skolem) command to replace the existentially quan-
tified variable. After that, the LEMMAS “stationA member”, “stationA except”,
“open exceptRec”, “open exceptGraph1”, “open exceptGraph2”, “ldacs UniExcept
Rec1”, “ldacs UniExceptRec2”, “ldacs stateChange” are brought into the antecedent
of the sequent. The proof strategy of these LEMMAS can be described as follows.
When a global exception called bothopen exception is raised in the StationA, the
StationA can use GlobalExceptPropagate operation to send this global exception
out to CC and CC can use ExceptRec operation to receive this global exception.
Since the sequence exceptions is not empty, the ExceptGraph operation in the CC
class sends out the uni exception!. The UEReceive operation in each Object of
LDAS can receive this uni exception?. When each Object of LDAS receives the
uni exception?, the state is changed to normal state. These transformations assure
that Objects in the LDAS can handle the global exception.
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Facing bothopen and bothclose Exceptions Raised Concurrently
When the bothopen exception has been raised in the StationA and the bothclose exception
has been raised in the StationB concurrently, the LDAS can handle this situation
which means that each Object such as LDACS can be recovered to normal execu-
tion process. This ldas ft2 property is firstly shown as the consequent {1} in the
theorem prover of PVS.
ldas_ft2 :
|-------
{1} (EXISTS (obj1: stationA.Object), (obj2: stationB.Object):
inter_state(obj1) = bothopen_exception AND
ue_rec(obj1) = 0 AND




Rule?: (flatten) Applying disjunctive simplification to flatten
sequent, this simplifies to:
......
Rule?: (lemma "stationA_except") Applying stationA_except this
simplifies to:
ldas_ft2 :
{-1} FORALL (obj: stationA.Object): exception =
GlobalExceptPropagate(obj)
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[-2] GlobalExceptPropagate(obj1!1) = bothopen_exception [-3]















Rerunning step: (assert) Simplifying, rewriting, and recording
with decision procedures, Q.E.D.
Run time = 0.38 secs. Real time = 0.98 secs.
The proof script for this property starts with the application of (flatten) to the
given conjecture followed by (skolem!) command to replace the existentially quan-
tified variable. After that, the LEMMAS “stationA member”, “stationA prop”,
“stationA except”, “open exceptRec”, “open exceptGraph1”, “open exceptGraph2”,
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“ldacs UniExceptRec1”, “ldacs UniExceptRec2”, “ldacs stateChange”, “ldacs
member1”, “ldacs UniExceptHandle”, “ldacs member2”, “ldacs UniExceptHandle2”
are brought in to the antecedent of the sequent. The proof strategy of these LEM-
MAS can be described as follows. When the bothopen exception raised in StationA
and the bothclose exception raised in StationB concurrently, each of them can use
GlobalExceptPropagate operation to send the exception out to the CC and the
CC can execute the ExceptRec operation to receive these two global exceptions.
Because the sequence exceptions is not empty, the ExceptGraph operation in the
CC class schema can send out the uni exception! which covers bothopen exception
and bothclose exception. The UEReceive operation in the LDACS can receive this
uni exception?. When the LDACS in the LDAS receives the uni exception?, its
state is changed to normal state.
7.3 Template based on PVS model of GFTSA
and Proof Scripts
The case study of LDAS can demonstrate that the developed LDAS guided by
GFTSA can preserve the fault tolerant properties by using the theorem prover
of PVS. When considering the fault tolerant properties of distributed systems
with high reliability requirements, for example, SCS and LDAS, we can summa-
rize these properties as the generic ones that the systems can deal with a global
exception or multiple raised global exceptions. These generic properties can be
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customized according to specific system. When mechanically verifying these prop-
erties, we interactively apply primitive proof commands to the theorem prover of
PVS. These primitive commands mainly involve “lemma name” preceded or fol-
lowed by “skolem!”, “instantiate”, “replace”, and “assert” commands. The “lemma
name” introduces an instance of the lemma named name as a new formula in the
sequent. The proof commands for one property can constitute the proof scripts for
such property. We investigate to summarize the generic proof script for the generic
fault tolerant properties. When mechanically verifying the fault tolerant properties
of developed system, we can customize the generic proof scripts and apply them
to the theorem prover of PVS directly. Therefore, we can verify the fault tolerant
properties of such system in the batch mode of PVS, and do not need to input
the proof scripts to the theorem prover one by one. ProofLite [53] technique can
provide user-friendly interface of batch mode execution and interactive proof script-
ing notation to the system designers. As the proof scripting notation supported
by ProofLite enables a semi-literate proving style where specification and proof
scripts reside in the same context, we investigate to extend the template based on
the PVS model of GFTSA to involve generic fault tolerant properties accompany-
ing with generic proof scripts by using XVCL and Prooflite techniques. Therefore,
we can build a template for the PVS specification and proof scripts of developed
systems guided by GFTSA, based on the PVS model of GFTSA and proof scripts
of generic fault tolerant properties. As shown in Figure 7.4, when developing a
safety critical distributed system guided by GFTSA, we can build x-frames for this
developed system by adapting the primitive x-frames in the template. Based on
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these built x-frames, we can generate the PVS specification and proof scripts for
the developed system automatically by running the XVCL processer. Based on
the generated specification and proof scripts, we can mechanically verify the fault


























Figure 7.4: Mechanical Verification Process.
The primitive x-frames in the template is composed of the x-frames for the specifi-
cation, and the x-frame for the proof scripts. These x-frames are illustrated in the
following.
7.3.1 The x-frames in the Template for the Specification
When we develop safety critical distributed systems guided by GFTSA, the PVS
model of developed systems can be customized from the PVS model of GFTSA by
importing the corresponding theories of GFTSA. In order to make this customiza-
tion process more efficient, we investigate to use XVCL technique [35] to build
a template. Following the XVCL methodology, the template is built as generic
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x-frames based on the theories of GFTSA accompanying with XVCL commands,
which mark the variation points. When developing specific systems, these varia-
tion points can be instantiated according to specific requirements. The x-frames
in the template are related with the corresponding theories of GFTSA, shown in











Figure 7.5: Relation between Template and GFTSA.
connector, and cc, are all written as the combination of PVS specification language
and XVCL commands. These x-frames is built for corresponding theories in the
PVS specification of developed systems, which already have been presented and
clarified in the Section 6.4.
7.3.2 The x-frame in the Template for the Proof Scripts
Based on the x-frames for the specification, shown in the Figure 7.5, we can gen-
erate the PVS model of developed system guided by GFTSA. Furthermore, in
order to provide the proof scripts for the fault tolerant properties of developed sys-
tems, we investigate to build the x-frame for the proof scripts by using the XVCL
and ProofLite techniques. This x-frame, namely ftsystem, replaces the ftsystem
x-frames presented in the Section 6.4 by involving proof scripts notation. This
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x-frame is built for the ftsystem theory of developed systems, which imports all the
components & connectors theories of developed system to specify how these com-
ponents & connectors synchronize together and the fault tolerant properties of such
systems. By using the ProofLite technique, we can put the generic proof scripts
written as the combination of ProofLite scripting notation and XVCL commands
following the corresponding fault tolerant properties in the ftsystem x-frame.
The x-frame for ftsystem
In the ftsystem x-frame, we present two generic fault tolerant properties that a
safety critical distributed system needs to preserve: one is that when a global
exception raised in an Object, the system can tolerate this exception which means
that any other Object can handle this exception and recover to normal execution
process; the other is that when two global exceptions raised in different Objects
concurrently, the system can handle this situation which means that other Object
in the system can recover to normal execution process. The proof scripts written as
the proof scripting notation of ProofLite are put following these two properties. In
the proof scripts, since the proof command “lemma name” are used to introduce
the lemma named name to the sequent, we also add several named lemmas to
the x-frame for ftsystem theory to help the verification. These named lemmas
are generic with some parameters which can be instantiated according to specific
requirements of different safety critical distributed systems, shown in the AXIOM.
<x-frame name="ftsystem" language="PVS">
<value-of expr="?@systemname?"/>: THEORY








(EXISTS (obj: <value-of expr="?@racomname?"/>.Object):
inter_state(obj)=<value-of expr="?@agname?"/> AND ue_rec(obj)=0)
IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: <value-of expr="?@recomname?"/>.Object):
.......
%|- <value-of expr="?@agftname?"/> : PROOF
%|- (then (flatten) (skolem!)
%|- (lemma "<value-of expr="?@racomname?"/>_member") (prop)
.......
%|- (lemma "<value-of expr="?@recomname?"/>_stateChange")
%|- (instantiate -1 ("obj!1" "ccp!1"))(assert))
%|- QED




inter_state(obj1)=<value-of expr="?@tgname1?"/> AND ue_rec(obj1)=0 AND
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inter_state(obj2)=<value-of expr="?@tgname2?"/> AND ue_rec(obj2)=0)
IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: <value-of expr="?@trecomname?"/>.Object):
.......
%|- <value-of expr="?@tgftname?"/> : PROOF
%|- (then (flatten) (skolem!) (prop)
........
%|- (lemma "<value-of expr="?@trecomname?"/>_UniExceptHandle2")




In this x-frame, for the property that a global exception raised, shown in the first
LEMMA, the name of such property is expressed as variable agftname, the Object
raised the exception are expressed as variable racomname, the raised exception
are expressed as variable agname, and the other Object which can handle this
exception are expressed as recomname. In the proof script for this property, the
names of lemma used in the proof command “lemma name” are all generic with
these variables. For the property that two global exception raised concurrently,
shown in the second LEMMA, the name of such property is expressed as variable
tgftname, the two Objects are expressed as racomname1 and racomname2, two
raised exceptions are expressed as tgname1 and tgname2, and the other Object can
recover to the normal execution is expressed as trecomname. The proof command
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“lemma name” in the proof script for this property are all generic with these
variables.
By the support of XVCL and ProofLite techniques, we build a template involv-
ing the x-frames not only for the specification, but also for the proof scripts of
developed safety critical distributed systems. By adapting these x-frames, we can
auto-generate the PVS specification and proof scripts for the developed systems.
Based on the generated specification and proof scripts, we can mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of developed systems in batch mode of PVS.
7.4 Case Study-EPS (Electronic Power System)
In this section, we present a case study of an Electric Power System (EPS) to
illustrate how we can generate the PVS specification and proof scripts of EPS from
our built template. Based on the generated PVS specification and proof scripts,
we can mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of EPS in batch mode of
PVS supported by ProofLite technique.
7.4.1 Electronic Power System(EPS)
As the primary source of power throughout the country, the electric power indus-
try is a key critical infrastructure application domain. Electric power is generated,
transmitted, and distributed by a complex system of power companies, utilities,
brokers, and merchants. We build model topology of EPS corresponding to the
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United States electric power grid information systems, as outlined in the NERC
operating manual [14]. The lower levels of the model topology are an abstraction
of the power grid in terms of power companies, generating stations, and substa-
tions. The higher levels of the model topology are control area, control region, and























































Figure 7.6: The Model Topology of EPS.
The substation reports the demand for power to its parent power company. The
generating station controls and reports the supply of power being generated to its
parent power company. The power company accepts data from substation and
generating station, calculates the balance of power, reports the surplus or deficit
to its parent control area, then balances supply and demand with any interchange
adjustment accordingly. The control area accepts power balances from power com-
panies, calculates and reports the control area balance to its parent control re-
gion, then redistributed any adjustment accordingly. The control region accepts
power balances from its control areas, calculates and reports the control region bal-
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ance to its parent interconnection, then redistributes any adjustment accordingly.
The interconnection accepts power balances from its control regions, calculates its
interconnection balance and swaps power with other interconnections according
to demand, then redistributes power interchanges amongst its control regions ac-
cording to demand. The hierarchical relationship among substation, generating
station, power company, and control area can be applied to the hierarchical rela-
tionship among control area, control region, and interconnection. Therefore, we
focus our development of EPS on the concurrency among substation, generation
station, power company and control area. According to the box-and-line patterns of
GFTSA shown in Figure 3.1, the EPS is composed of four Objects, namely Substa-
tion, GeneratingStation, PowerCompany, and ControlArea, six Connectors, namely
SPC, PCS, PCA, CAP, PCG, and GPC, one CoordinatingComponent, namely CC,
and two SharedResources, namely PCDB and CADB.
7.4.2 Generation of PVS Specification and Proof Scripts
Referring to the Figure 7.4, when developing a safety critical distributed system
guided by GFTSA, we need to build x-frames for the developed system by adapt-
ing the corresponding x-frame in the template shown in Section 7.3. Figure 7.7
describes x-frame adaptation relationships between the x-frames of EPS and the
built template. The epsconstant is built to declare the global constants which
will be used by all the components & connectors theories in the EPS model. The
gsation, subsation, powercompany, and controlarea are built for GeneratingStation,
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Substation, PowerCompany, and ControlArea correspondingly. The gpc, pcg, pcs,
spc, pca, and cap x-frames are built for six connectors in the EPS. The epscc x-
frame is built for the CC component, and the pcdb and cadb x-frames are built for
the SharedResource PCDB and CADB correspondingly. The eps x-frame is built
to describe how these components & connectors synchronize and the proof scripts






















Figure 7.7: The x-frame Adaption Relationship of EPS.
When building these x-frames for EPS, we just need to instantiate the variation
points defined in the x-frames of template according to the specific requirements of
EPS . For example, when building epscc x-frame for the CoordinatingComponent




<insert break="egraph"> <![CDATA[IF check(PCDBAttacked, ge) OR
check(CADBAttacked,ge) THEN DBAttacked
ELSE except




In this epscc x-frame, the defined variable ccname in the cc x-frame, shown in
the Section 6.4.3, are given the value epscc. The function egraph is also defined
that when the CoordinatingComponent in the EPS receives PCDBATTACKED
or DBATTACKED exception, the resolved universal exception needs to be set as
DBATTACKED exception.
Referring to the adaption relationship, the eps x-frame is built via adapting the
ftsystem x-frame, shown in Figure 7.7. In the eps x-frame, we need to set values
to the variables defined in the ftsystem according to the specific fault tolerant
properties of EPS. The fault tolerant properties that EPS can handle involve eps ft1
and eps ft2 properties. The eps ft1 is that EPS can deal with a global exception,
namely PCDBAttacked, raised in the PowerCompany, and the eps ft2 is that EPS
can deal with two global exceptions, namely PCDBAttacked and CADBAttacked,
which are raised concurrently in the PowerCompany and ControlArea. According
















In this eps x-frame, for the fault tolerant property eps ft1, the variable agname
for a raised global exception is set as PCDBAttacked, and the variable for the
Object raising the exception is set as powercompany. Following this methodology,
the variables defined in the ftsystem x-frames are all set values according to the
specific fault tolerant properties.
By running the XVCL processor with the geps SPC file which adapts all of the
15 x-frames of EPS, we can generate the PVS specification and proof scripts of
EPS automatically1. Figure 7.8 shows the model design of SCS in the box-and-line
fashion guided by the pattern of GFTSA.
1The PVS specification and proofs scripts of EPS is presented in http://www.comp.nus.edu.
sg/~yuanling/eps-pvs.pdf.



























Figure 7.8: GFTSA Architecture View of EPS sub-System.
7.4.3 Mechanical Verification of EPS
Based on the generated PVS specification and proof scripts, we can mechanically
verify the fault tolerant properties of EPS in batch mode of PVS supported by
ProofLite technique. The generated eps theory is shown as follows, which involves
not only the eps ft1 and eps ft2 fault tolerant properties of EPS, but also the
corresponding proof scripts written as ProofLite proof scripting notation.
eps : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING gpc, pcg, spc, pcs, pca, cap, epscc, pcdb, cadb,
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inter_state(obj)=PCDBAttacked AND ue_rec(obj)=0) IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: substation.Object):
member(inter_state(UniExceptHandle(obj)),substation.n_states))
%|- eps_ft1 : PROOF
%|- (then (flatten) (skolem!) (lemma "powercompany_member") (prop)
%|- (replace -2 (-2 -1) rl) (lemma "powercompany_prop")
.......
%|- (instantiate -1 ("obj!1" "ccp!1")) (assert) (prop) (hide -4)




inter_state(obj1)=PCDBAttacked AND ue_rec(obj1)=0 AND
inter_state(obj2)=CADBAttacked AND ue_rec(obj2)=0) IMPLIES
(FORALL (obj: substation.Object):
member(inter_state(UniExceptHandle(obj)),substation.n_states))
%|- eps_ft2 : PROOF
%|- (then (flatten) (skolem!) (prop) (lemma "powercompany_member")
.......
%|- (lemma "substation_UniExceptHandle1") (replace -3 (-3 -1) rl)





ProofLite technique provides a user-friendly interface to the PVS batch mode exe-
cution. Based on the proof scripts written as the proof scripts notation of ProofLite
accompanying with fault tolerant properties, we can just use command proveit to
execute the theorem prover in batch mode. Therefore, by running the command
proveit eps, we can mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of EPS in batch
mode, and the verification result will be output to the epsft.out file. After checking
out the verification results in the output file epsft.out, which are both true, we can
conclude that the developed EPS guided by GFTSA can preserve the fault tolerant
properties to satisfy high reliability requirements.
7.5 Conclusion
GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of safety critical distributed systems.
In this chapter, we present a case study of LDAS to illustrate how we can develop
specific safety critical distributed systems guided by GFTSA, generate the PVS
model of LDAS from the template based on PVS model of GFTSA, and mechan-
ically verify the fault tolerant properties of LDAS by using the theorem prover
of PVS. In order to make the mechanical verification for the developed systems
guided by GFTSA more systematic, we extend the template based on PVS model
of GFTSA to involve not only generic PVS specification, but also generic proof
scripts. This template is built as generic and adaptable x-frames, based on the
PVS model of GFTSA and generic proof scripts of fault tolerant properties. The
primitive x-frames in the template are written as the combination of PVS spec-
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ification language, and ProofLite proof scripting notation, together with XVCL
commands. By customizing this template, we can not only generate the PVS
specification of developed systems, but also the proof scripts for the fault tolerant
properties of these systems.
A case study of EPS is used to illustrate how we can generate the PVS specification
and proof scripts of EPS from the extension template. Based on the generated
specification and proof scripts, we can mechanically verify that EPS can preserve
fault tolerant properties in batch mode of PVS supported by ProofLite technique.

Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the main contributions of the thesis and discussion pos-




Distributed systems are becoming increasingly widespread in business and scientific
computing environments, which often give rise to complex concurrent and inter-
acting activities. Due to no small measure to their complexity, distributed systems
are prone to faults and errors. For safety critical distributed systems, which have
high requirements for reliability, fault tolerant techniques are necessary to provide
a practical way to satisfy the reliability requirements. The concern of the fault tol-
erant properties makes the development of distributed systems more complicated.
In order to address this problem, this thesis investigates to propose a novel het-
erogenous software architecture to ease the complexity of the development of the
distributed systems with high reliability requirements.
One important contribution of this thesis is the building of a novel software ar-
chitecture, namely Generic Fault Tolerant Software Architecture (GFTSA), which
can provide a framework to guide the development of distributed systems with
high reliability requirements. On the one hand, the architecture style of GFTSA
combines several widely used basic architecture styles: object-oriented organiza-
tion, pipe-and-filter, and repository style, which can provide a framework to guide
the development of distributed systems involving both cooperative and competitive
concurrency. On the other hand, in order to satisfy the reliability requirements of
the distributed systems, GFTSA incorporates the fault tolerant techniques in the
early system design phase, which provides an efficient way for system designers to
reuse these techniques. Since interactive and concurrent properties of distributed
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systems, the fault tolerant techniques incorporated in GFTSA needs to concern the
consequence of the exceptions not only to the component which raises the excep-
tion, but also to other components interact with this component. The exceptions
occurred in the distributed environment are classified into local exceptions and
global exception according to their influence to the interactive components. The
fault tolerant techniques incorporated in GFTSA involve idealized fault tolerant
component and coordinated error recovery mechanism, which can help deal with
the local exceptions and global exceptions raised in the distributed environment.
In order to provide explicit and precise idioms & patterns to the system designers,
another contribution of this thesis is to formally model the proposed GFTSA by
using the formal language Object-Z. Many researchers have used formal language
Z to formalize the state & computation of software architectures. Object-Z is an
extension of Z to accommodate the object-orientated style. Compared to formal
language Z, Object-Z can improve clarity of large specification through enhanced
structuring, which can be used to model the static and dynamic features of GFTSA
in a very explicit and understandable way. The components and connector in
GFTSA all are represented as class schemas, which can be reused to develop the
high level model of safety critical distributed systems by using the inheritance &
instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z.
How the software architecture can be reused via customization in the development
of specific systems is an interesting issue in the software architecture community.
Another contribution of this thesis is to build a template based on the Object-Z
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model of GFTSA by using XVCL technique. This template is composed of generic
and adaptable x-frames, which are written as the combination of Object-Z formal
language and XVCL commands. This template can be customized to generate the
Object-Z model of distributed systems with high reliability requirements automat-
ically according to specific requirements. The customization process can be small
or large change to the template, which cannot be totally supported by the inheri-
tance & instantiation mechanisms of Object-Z, but can be supported by the XVCL
technique.
Since the main intention of GFTSA is to guide the development of distributed
systems with high reliability requirements, the significant properties that GFTSA
needs to preserve are the fault tolerant properties, which can satisfy the high reli-
ability requirements of such systems. Based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, we
can formally reason about the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA manually by us-
ing the reasoning rules of Object-Z. Since Object-Z has no tool support for verifying
the models, the manual verification is laborious and error prone. Another interest-
ing contribution of this thesis is to embed the GFTSA model in PVS to achieve
mechanical verification support for reasoning about the fault tolerant properties.
The powerful theorem prover of PVS can prove many results systematically and
automatically. By using the theorem prover of PVS, we can mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA successfully.
The developed distributed systems guided by GFTSA also need to preserve fault
tolerant properties to satisfy the reliability requirements. Since the theorem prover
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of PVS can mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of GFTSA successfully,
we investigate to apply the theorem prover of PVS in the verification of developed
systems. Another interesting contribution of this thesis is to present a template
approach for the auto-generation of specification and proof obligations at the cus-
tomized system level from GFTSA. This template is built as generic and adaptable
x-frames, which are written as the combination of PVS specification language, and
ProofLite notation, accompanying with XVCL commands. The x-frames involved
in the template are built based on the PVS model of GFTSA and generic proof
scripts. When developing a safety critical distributed system, by customizing this
template, we can generate not only the PVS model, but also the proof scripts for
the fault tolerant properties of this system. The customized proof scripts for the
fault tolerant properties can be applied directly to the theorem prover of PVS to
mechanically verify these properties in the batch mode of PVS. This batch model
of PVS supported by ProofLite technique can help us just use one command to
verify these fault tolerant properties. Therefore, we do not need to input proof
commands interactively to guide the theorem prover of PVS to verify properties.
Looking back to our whole thesis work, when we develop a specific safety critical
distributed system, there are two ways we can go. The one way is that firstly
we can generate the Object-Z model of specific system by adapting the template
based on the Object-Z model of GFTSA, secondly, in order to mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of developed system, we can generate the PVS model
and proof scripts of developed system by adapting the template based on the PVS
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model of GFTSA and generic proofs scripts, finally, we can mechanically verify
the fault tolerant properties of developed system in batch mode. Another way is
that we directly generate the PVS model and proof scripts of developed system
by adapting the template based on the PVS model of GFTSA and generic proof
scripts, and mechanically verify the fault tolerant properties of developed system
in batch mode. For the first way, the system designers can not only get the Objet-Z
model, but also the PVS model. The Object-Z model can provide precise analysis
and documentation, and the PVS model can support mechanical verification. But
the system designers need to be familiar with both Object-Z and PVS formal
languages, and take more effect to generate these two models. For the second way,
the system designers do not need to move to the Object-Z model, and generate the
PVS model and proof scripts of developed system directly. Since the PVS model
also can provide the formal specification of developed system, I recommend that
the system designers can directly go the second way to generate the PVS model
and proof scripts of developed system by adapting the template based on the PVS
model of GFTSA and generic proof scripts.
8.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we propose a novel heterogenous software architecture GFTSA to
guide the high level system design of distributed systems with high reliability re-
quirements. In order to satisfy reliability requirements of such systems, our pro-
posed GFTSA incorporated idealized fault tolerant component and coordinated er-
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ror recovery mechanism to deal with the exceptions occurred in the distributed envi-
ronment. These fault tolerant techniques only can handle specific set of exceptions,
some other exceptions, such as the inconsistent global states problem[54, 82], can-
not be handled successfully. One of our future works is to incorporate more powerful
fault tolerant techniques, such as selective checkpointing & rollback schemas [37]
in GFTSA to deal with these complicated exceptions.
In order to make the mechanical verification of developed systems guided by GFTSA
more efficient, we have built a template for the PVS specification and proof scripts
of fault tolerant properties for such systems. This template involves generic proof
scripts for two generic fault tolerant properties. In the future work, this template
can be further extended to involve more generic fault tolerant properties accompa-
nying with generic proof scripts.
GFTSA is proposed to guide the development of distributed systems with high
reliability requirements. Since Object-Z language is a good modeling techniques
that can provide explicit and precise structure and fault tolerant features of models
to the users, by customizing the built template based on the Object-Z model of
GFTSA, we can generate the Object-Z models of developed systems. However, our
generated formal models for developed systems are high level model design, how
these models can be transformed to the executive models is another further research
direction for us. FT-SR [81] is a programming language developed for designing
fault-tolerant distributed systems, which is the extensions to the concurrent pro-
gramming language SR [6]. The distinguishing feature of FT-SR is its flexibility of
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structuring systems according to any structuring paradigms. This feature makes us
choose programming language FT-SR to build the executive model of distributed
system with high reliability requirements. Our future work is to build the rules to
transform the Object-Z models to the executive models in FT-SR.
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